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MAY 1968 GRAFFITI 
 
 
 
“Be young and shut up”  
One interpretation of De Gaulle’s relationship with the French youth 
 
 
 iv	  
 
 
“CRS=SS” 
The CRS are the French Riot Police. They were in charge of pacifying the streets of Paris 
during the May 1968 revolts. 
 v	  
 
“We are all Jews and Germans” 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the leaders of the student revolts, was a German-born Jew 
and was deported from France by order of the government. 
 vi	  
 
“La Chienlit – that’s him!” 
During the May 1968 revolts, President Charles De Gaulle responded to the demands of 
the students asking for greater political participation, by saying “Reforms – Yes; Chienlit 
– No”. The word is a scatological pun, meaning both ‘shit-in-bed’, and ‘chaos’. The 
poster exemplifies the students’ response. 
 vii	  
 
“Return to normality” 
By mid-June, due to forceful government crackdowns on both workers and students as 
well as De Gaulle’s decision to call for a general election by the end of June, the revolts 
died down and life returned to normality... 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
 In May 1968, the French began to talk. For the four subsequent decades they 
talked about sexuality and liberation. They talked about fraternity and authority. They 
talked about anarchism and Gaullism. They talked about worker’s rights and economic 
growth. They talked about education and free play. They talked about the society of the 
spectacle and declared a permanent state of happiness. They talked about the general will 
and the General’s will. Above all else, they talked about May 1968.  
 The revolts of May 1968, a month-long craze of strikes, protests and general 
euphoria in Paris and number of other French metropolitan centers, have for the French 
public become “the most important event since World War II”.1 This is evident from a 
single look at the ten-year commemorations of May 1968, which have been accompanied 
by an explosion of memoirs, scholarly analyses, journalistic overviews, pamphlets, 
broadcasts and publications of all sorts.2 The level of attention accorded to 1968 by the 
French media has grown with every passing decade. The three major French TV channels 
devoted 12 hours to the students’ and workers’ revolts in May 1978, 17 hours in 1988, 23 
hours in 1998 and 32 hours in 2008.3 Publishing special editions reviewing the events and 
effects of May has become standard practice for major French newspapers during 
milestone anniversaries. The presence of 1968 in university curriculums and scholarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Frank, “Introduction” in Les Années 68: Le temps de la contestation, G. 
Dreyfus-Armand, A. de Baecque, eds, Paris: Editions Complexe, 2000, 22 
2 Michael Seidman, The Imaginary Revolution: Parisian Students and Workers in 1968, 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2004, 7  
3 cf, Appendix 1. List of TV broadcasts in French television concerning anniversaries of 
May 1968  
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publications is equally strong. Even in politics, May 1968 remains topical, having just 
recently been invoked by presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy during the 2007 
elections. The memory of May has not simply survived for four decades, it has 
flourished. 
 Yet this memory is anything but uniform. This is evident already from the variety 
of terms that have become associated with May 1968. While the events of 1789 or 1871 
have been canonized under the names “Revolution” and “Commune”, May 1968 has 
been called, with equal frequency, anything from “events” to “’crisis’, ‘strike’, ‘revolt’, 
‘revolution’, ‘student commune’, ‘civil war’, ‘chienlit/dog’s breakfast’ [---] or the simple 
chronological ‘May’ (followed or not by ‘[19]68’)”.4 Representations of May have 
changed in time and across communities. In fact, it is sometimes hard to believe that 
terms like “historical earthquake” and “a popular myth” could be used to describe the 
same event.5 Here, then, lies the focus of this thesis - with the multiplicity of 
interpretations and shifts in French popular memory of May 1968. How did 
commemorations of 1968 portray the event they celebrated and what does that tell us 
about developments in French society and about the dynamics of memory construction 
and reproduction? 
 The answer to this question can only start at one place: Paris, in May of 1968. The 
events of May can broadly be divided into three phases. From May 2nd to May 12th the 
student protests and barricades dominated the events in Paris. May 13th marked the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Keith Reader & Khursheed Wadia, The May 1968 Events in France, London: 
MacMillan, 1993, 1 
5 Histoire de Mai, pt 1, FR3, May 7th, 1978, INA and  “Mai 68 – 40 ans aprés”, on 
Actualités a 12 heures, FR3, May 2nd, 2008, INA 
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beginning of the workers’ revolt, with an opening salvo in the form of a 24-hour general 
strike and a large inter-union demonstration in support of the students’ revolt. In the 
following days the strikes multiplied and spread, the number of striking workers reached 
a high of 7-8 million, and much of Paris, not to mention the country, was paralyzed for 
days.6 Finally on May 24th, French president Charles De Gaulle made a televised speech, 
where he called for a referendum on university reform, promising to step down if it 
failed. This marked the beginning of an official response to the crisis, though one that 
was criticized by the right as being too soft and by the left as being woefully ignorant of 
the real problems underlying the strikes and student revolts.7 The televised announcement 
was followed by negotiations with workers’ unions at Grenelle on May 25th and 26th, De 
Gaulle’s visit (sometimes also described as a flight) to Germany on the 29th and the 
dissolution of the National Assembly by the reinvigorated General on the 30th. Still, the 
revolts and demonstrations carried over into early June, culminating finally with a violent 
conflict in the Latin Quarter between the students and the police during the night of June 
11th. The following week, most of the strikes as well as most protests finally came to an 
end.8  
 The student revolts of May, by far its most famous and celebrated aspect, 
originated at the University of Nanterre, an institution with a long history of student 
unrest. Throughout the month of April 1968, groups of radical left-wing students, from 
Maoists and Trostkyists to anarchists and general troublemakers describing themselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bernard Pudal, “Les événements de mai et juin 1968: bref récit chronologique” in Mai-
Juin 68, D. Damamme, B. Gobille, F. Matonti, B. Pudal, eds., Paris: Les Editions de 
L’Atelier, 2008, 189 
7 Seidman, 183-184 
8 ibid.,250-253 
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with the appealing yet vague title les enragés (the enraged), held protests and sit-ins, 
disrupted classes and sometimes simply assaulted professors and other representatives of 
the “imperialist bourgeoisie”.9 On May 2nd, the Movement of March 22nd, a radical 
anarchist group led by a German-Jewish sociology student Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 
organized an “anti-imperialism day” on Nanterre’s campus. In response, Dean Pierre 
Grappin, with the support of the French Ministry of Education, decided to shut down the 
university campus and put the anti-authoritarian students on a disciplinary hearing 
scheduled for May 6th. The very next day, several student organizations including the 
French National Student Union (UNEF) and the Young Revolutionary Communists 
(JCR) occupied the Sorbonne.10 Fearing that this act of protest would lead to a similar 
shut down of the University’s operations, Alain Peyrefitte, minister of Education, and 
Jean Roche, Rector of the Sorbonne, called in the police, who had traditionally kept away 
from university territory.11 
This was the last straw for many students. A wave of mass protests erupted, 
students built barricades and drew graffiti on the streets of Paris portraying the French 
authorities in a uniquely pejorative and disdainful light. Next to joyous situationnist-
inspired slogans, like “Beneath the pavement, the beach” or “Be a realist – demand the 
impossible”, students drew harsh criticisms of the government and the police. Some of 
the more memorable, but by no means the most radical of the graffiti included lines like 
“CRS=SS” or “Be young and shut up!” scribbled next to a caricature of General De 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ibid., 80-84 
10 Pudal, 190 
11 Reader & Wadia, 10-11 
 5	  
Gaulle, instantly recognizable by his oversized nose.12 Though protests and 
demonstrations were happening all around France, Paris became the front and center of 
the student revolt, culminating in “the Night of Barricades” on May 10th, when students 
and their supporters closed off the entire left bank of the Seine with makeshift 
obstructions. The police and CRS struck back, arresting over 500 people during the night 
at the cost of over 250 injured policemen.13 
Two events pushed the revolts of May to a new level of intensity. On May 13th, 
two big trade unions, the CGT and the CFDT, organized a general strike in support of the 
students. According to different sources, the workers’ demonstration was attended by 
200,000 – 800,000 people.14 The next day president Charles De Gaulle left the country 
for a diplomatic visit to Romania, cementing the impression that the government was out 
of touch with the people and had no clue how to react.15 The crisis spread: riots engulfed 
most Parisian universities, students occupied the Odéon theatre, strikes spread through 
the entire country, even journalists at the state-run broadcasting corporation ORTF 
stopped following orders. The French Communist Party (PCF) started organizing a  
unified left-wing front. Jean-Paul Sartre joined the students at the Sorbonne, while Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, who had German citizenship, was issued a deportation order.  
And finally, a response. On May 24th De Gaulle called for a referendum on “a 
renovation encompassing the university system, the society and the economy”, followed 
by an opening of negotiations with the CGT and the CFDT the following day. By that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The CRS were the French riot police, deployed to contain the street riots and the 
occupation of the Sorbonne.  
13 Seidman, 117 
14 Reader and Wadia, 11; Pudal, 191 
15 Reader and Wadia, 12 
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time “France was paralyzed, with more than 8 million people on strike, no public 
transport and precious little petrol.”16 The Grenelle negotiations concluded with an 
outline promising a 35% increase in the SMIC (the industrial minimum wage), but the 
treaty was left unsigned. Leaving without a conclusive result, the workers went back on 
strike and the student revolts resumed.17 On May 28th, Francois Mitterrand, leader of the 
parliamentary socialists, issued a statement calling for an interim government to replace 
the “present government, incapable of resolving this crisis” and a presidential election 
with himself as a candidate.18 Ironically enough, De Gaulle nearly affirmed Mitterand’s 
claims by leaving the country by helicopter on the 29th. For several hours, no-one in the 
administration or in the press had any idea of his whereabouts. The country was without a 
head, literally.19 
It turned out the President had flown to Baden Baden, in Germany, to consult 
General Jacques Massu, an officer hardened by the Algerian War. Massu assured to De 
Gaulle the continued support of loyal Gaullists and the President returned a day later, 
with newfound energy and resolve.20 
The same could not be said about the Left. The parliamentary left failed in 
forming a popular coalition that could deliver on the reforms called by Mitterand at the 
one end and the PCF at the other. Mitterand and other mainstream leftists were afraid to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ibid., 14 
17 Seidman, 194-195 
18 Francois Mitterand, Déclaration de M. Francois Mitterand, 28 mai 1968, 
http://www.georges-
pompidou.org/epoque/documentation_diverse/pol_int/Mitt28mai68.htm, Last Accessed 
03/06/10 
19 Daniel Singer, Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968, Cambridge: South End 
Press, 2002, 195 
20 Seidman, 218-219 
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ally themselves with the radical PCF, but a coalition of the left would have been 
unthinkable without them. Similarly, the PCF was unsympathetic towards the moderates, 
who in their view advocated neo-capitalist and pro-American policies.21 Thus, when De 
Gaulle returned on May 30th, he found the Élysées palace in the exact order as he had left 
it – nothing had changed and the Left had lost their one chance at exploiting the 
momentary loss of leadership.  
Two things happened on May 30th. De Gaulle held a speech that soon became 
known as an example of masterful political oratory. He reminded the workers that they 
had received gains that under all other circumstance would seem unbelievably generous. 
He affirmed that he would not step down and would continue to carry out his mandate. 
He reminded that he had in powers the option of taking military action, suggested that a 
failure to contain the crisis might result in the imposition of “communist totalitarianism”. 
Finally he reaffirmed the strength of French democracy and announced he would dissolve 
the National Assembly and call for new legislative election at the end of June.22  
Second, a mass demonstration took place in the evening of the 30th. On the 
surface, it was a demonstration like many others in that fateful May: some 300 000 
people marched down the Champs-Elysées, among them prominent writers and 
intellectuals. But this time, one thing was different: the people were marching in support 
of De Gaulle, not against him. The President’s forceful speech combined with the 
continued paralysis of all economic activity in Paris had finally awoken the Gaullists. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ibid. 
22 Charles de Gaulle, quoted in Laurent Joffrin, Mai 68: Histoire des événements, Paris: 
Seuil, 1988, 295-296 
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Though demonstrations and strikes continued through the first weeks of June, 
they no longer had the same momentum. After nearly a full month of strikes, many 
workers were in debt, bored, and desperately wanting to return to work. Others felt that a 
35% salary increase was not a bad result for a few weeks of strikes. Meanwhile, private 
and government strikebreakers were at work and ordinary French citizens were longing 
for life to return to normal.23 On June 16th, the Sorbonne was cleared out by the police 
and the CRS and two weeks later the Gaullists scored their biggest victory at legislative 
elections to date, gaining over 100 seats in the parliament, mostly on the account of 
various left-wing parties. By June 30th 1968, May had finally ended. 
The legacy of May 1968 has been assessed, reassesed, contested, overturned and 
reformulated countless times during the following decades. Over time, a body of 
literature has emerged focusing primarily on the revisionist history of May 1968, 
demystifying popular and scholarly accounts of May and contrasting them with novel, 
alternative narratives. Often these treatments focus on aspects that mainstream accounts 
of 1968 tend to omit or occlude. It is within this context that this thesis should be 
situated.  
One of the first English overviews of May’s legacy in scholarly and popular 
discourse is Keith Reader’s The May 1968 Events in France: Reproductions and 
Interpretations.24 In addition to providing a concise account of the events of May 1968, 
Reader concentrates on systematizing the variety of responses and retrospectives to 1968. 
He reviews a variety of scholarly interpretations of May, ranging from those that saw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Seidman, 226-233 
24 Keith Reader & Khursheed Wadia, The May 1968 Events in France, London: 
MacMillan, 1993 
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1968 as an “enterprise of subversion” to those that considered it “a rush of blood to the 
head, a youthful revolt”.25 Significantly, Reader notes, cultural interpretations of May 
dominate all other readings, political, individualist or social. The further one gets from 
May, the more one tends to replace political readings of May with cultural ones, 
“reflecting the piecemeal replacement of revolutionary politics with radical culture that 
has characterized the period since May”.26  
Though the book’s emphasis is on scholarly accounts of May, Reader also 
devotes a chapter to representations of May in fiction and film, noting most significantly 
a relative lack of written works dealing with the fateful month. In Reader’s view, this is 
due to the fundamentally diffuse nature of May, one that lends itself perhaps to partisan 
pamphlets and cinematic experimentation (which he finds in abudance in the works of 
Jean-Luc Godard), but evades the narrative form.27 By Reader’s account, May 1968 in 
fiction and traditional film is notable mostly by its absence. 
Jean-Pierre Le Goff takes a different look at the legacy of May in his 500-page 
heavyweight study Mai 68: L’Héritage Impossible.28 The book traces the development of 
ideas, political movements and cultural heritage born of or matured in ’68, from the 
philosophy of Michel Foucault to the reorganization of the French university system. Le 
Goff links changes in French society to their supposed origins in ’68, showing how 
almost every aspect of French culture and society has been touched by the legacy of May. 
In a companion article that appeared in the Spring 2008 edition of Le Débat, Le Goff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid., 20-47 
26 ibid., 87 
27 ibid.,117 
28 Jean-Pierre Le Goff, Mai 68: L’Héritage Impossible, Paris: La Découverte, 2002. 
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situates May “between two worlds”, between the youthful optimism of the Trente 
Glorieuses29 and the end-of-century pessimism shaped by an increasingly darker view of 
the future and the validation of left-wing ecologists and feminists. The joyous emotions 
of May are, in Le Goff’s view, the vehicles keeping mainstream intepretations of 1968 
alive.30 
While Reader and Le Goff concern themselves with delineating the legacy of May 
in literature and society, two American scholars – Kristin Ross and Michael Seidman – 
are interested in disspelling the mainstream accounts of May 1968 and providing 
alternative accounts, as well as alternative legacies. Kristin Ross argues in May 1968 and 
Its Afterlives that reading May as a cultural revolution first and foremost is at best a 
deeply rooted misconception and at worst a deliberate obfuscation of the true, political, 
nature of May.31 The key to understanding May lies not with the students who initiated 
the revolts, nor with the individual destinies of a few individuals that stood tallest on the 
barricades, but with the collective solidarity of millions of workers looking for radical 
change. According to Ross, mainstream narratives of May have obscured the true goals 
of political activists who initiated it, leaving only the cultural accomplishments, which 
are often used as examples purportedly proving the “success” of the 1968 
demonstrations.32 Though Ross notes that central to her enterprise is understanding how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Literally ‘The Glorious Thirty’, a period from 1945-1975 in France characterized by 
rapid economic growth, and the transformation of French economy from an agricultural 
one ravaged by two World Wars to an industrial economy with one of the world’s highest 
standards of living. The Glorious Thirty came to an end with the oil crisis of the 1970s. 
30 Jean-Pierre Le Goff, “Mai 68: La France entre deux mondes” in Le Débat, 149 (2008), 
83-99 
31 Kristin Ross, May 1968 and Its Afterlives, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 
32 ibid., 5-6 
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this distorted narrative of May came to prevail, she seems more concerned with setting 
the record straight, bringing to light the true face of May; a face which happens to be that 
of Janus, with the face of an opressed worker on one side and a critical philosopher on the 
other. 
Michael Seidman proposes a different revision of May’s mythology. In The 
Imaginary Revolution: Parisian Students and Workers in 1968, Seidman argues against 
the popular notion according to which “May changed everything”.33 In his retelling of the 
events of May 1968, Seidman shows their relative unimportance, in both their course and 
their impact. In his view, most of the social changes that May is credited with had their 
origins in the years far preceding ’68. “The events of May did not mark a rupture but 
instead showed the continuity of social and political trends. No crisis of civilization 
suddenly erupted, and no significant attempt at workers’  control emerged.”34  
Both Seidman and Ross agree that scholarly and popular perceptions of May are 
flawed and inaccurate in their portrayals of 1968, though for different reasons. However, 
neither shows great interest in how this particular perception came to prevail. Kristin 
Ross discusses the evolution of French philosophy and politics after 1968 at length, 
tracing the ways in which both became interested in revisionist accounts May that in her 
view occluded May’s true legacy. Seidman briefly describes the changing attitudes of 
commemorative events through the post-May decades, but explaining their emergence is 
not a part of his argument. This thesis aims to fill in some of the aforementioned gaps by 
discussing the formation of historical memory, changes in popular narratives of May, 
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different assessments and evaluations of 1968 as seen through commemorative events, 
and by deconstructing some of the enduring myths about the month of barricades. 
Granted we will not be the first embarking on this journey – an anniversary article 
in the Spring 2008 issue of Le Débat reviews 40 years of May’s commemorations.35 By 
this account, May avoided “historization” for more than two decades, fueled by the 
passions of individuals whose lives were shaped by 1968 and the relevance of May’s 
symbolism to contemporary events – the reaction against president Valérie Giscard 
d’Estaing’s poor handling of the 1970s oil crisis and Francois Mitterrand’s precarious 
tenure as a socialist president.36  This mythologized version of May then became 
ingrained in popular memory and subsequent attempts at historical revisionism no longer 
had the same traction as accounts provided by eye-witnesses and active soixante-
huitards.37  
Kristin Ross too discusses the commemorations of May both in May 1968 and Its 
Afterlives and in a 2002 article in Critical Inquiry.38 In her view, the 1980s marked the 
establishment of a “false consensus” about May. This inaccurate portrayal linked May to 
the development of individualism, an affirmation market democracy and a concern about 
neo-liberal human rights. The highly political May got reduced to the status of a youth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Jean-Pierre Rioux, “L’évenement-mémoire: Quarante Ans de Commémorations” in Le 
Débat, 149 (2008), 4-19 
36 ibid., 13 
37 ibid., 16. Soixante-huitard means literally ‘sixty-eighter’, a term used to describe active 
participants of the May 1968 revolts. 
38 Kristin Ross, “Establishing Consensus: May ’68 as Seen in France from the 1980s” in 
Critical Inquiry, 28/3 (2002), 650-676 
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revolt, a necessary consequence of generational transition, because “all young people 
revolt - it’s a part of growing up”.39   
While this thesis adopts many of the arguments advanced by Jean-Pierre Rioux 
and Kristin Ross, it also tries to avoid a homogenization of May’s memory and provide a 
more nuanced and varied account of the legacy of ’68 in popular consciousness through a 
reading of select and specific episodes of commemoration. This thesis is not an attempt at 
delineating a ‘consensus’, it is rather an exercise in showing the various contradictions 
and controversies that have emerged from popular memories of May. This multifocal 
perspetive should also enable the reader to view the process of memory creation through 
a variety of theoretical lenses, incorporating elements from historical theory, discourse 
analysis and literary theory, to name just a few.  
This thesis discusses four significant narratives about May ’68 that have 
transformed and evolved through four decades of commemoration. By tracing and 
deconstructing these stories, we gain insight to the ways in which memory is molded and 
myths are constructed. Chapter one deals with the political appropriations of May. This is 
perhaps one of the easiest ways to understand how myths are created, because the actors 
shaping public narratives are easily defined (they are politicians associated with specific 
parties holding specific ideologies) and their objectives are explicit and well understood. 
It seems safe to assume that a politician speaking in a political context will in some form 
be oriented towards legitimizing his authority and cementing his power by portraying his 
interests and worldviews as convergent with those of his voters. It follows then that when 
politicians and ideologues talk about May, they are at least influenced, if not shaped by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ibid., 674 
 14	  
the political realities of the day. A minister whose every word is dissected and discussed 
by the press would never say anything about a historical event that could undermine his 
authority in the present, or his chances for re-election in the future.40  The first chapter 
looks at how the mythology of May has evolved, both on the Left as well as the Right, 
and connects these changes to changes in French politics. Left-wing activists saw May as 
a reminder of progressive failures, an image only exacerbated by the presidency of 
Francois Mitterrand and his cohabitation with right-wing conservatives. For the Right, 
May was initially proof of the Gaullists’ continued success, but as the social and cultural 
effects of May rippled through French society and became accepted norms of behavior, 
the Right adopted a new narrative, portraying 1968 as the origin of everything that was 
wrong with French society, from a lack of moral values to the capitalist excesses of large 
corporations and banks.  
Chapter two looks at the emergence and persistence of Daniel Cohn-Bendit as a 
central figure in the May 1968 mythology. This case study allows us to focus on a 
specific instance where memory has been appropriated and utilized for political ends. 
Cohn-Bendit’s story additionally shows how narratives and archetypes that tap into issues 
and controversies already present in public memory become permanent fixtures of the 
collective consciousness. Though his role in the actual events of May ’68 was relatively 
small, Daniel Cohn-Bendit has become in the following decades so closely associated 
with May that it is almost impossible to discuss the events of May without discussing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The use of memory as a political tool, specifically as a legitimization of the nation-state 
and the dominant elites has been examined in-depth in Max Paul Friedman, “Memory 
and the Contest for Hegemony in Politics” in The Merits of Memory, , eds H. Grabbe, S. 
Schneider, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2008,135-138 
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Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the process. Chapter two looks at the emergence of Cohn-Bendit 
as a metonym for May at ties it to his “trickster” personality and his post-May political 
career as a Member of the European Parliament and a Green activist. Further, Chapter 
two analyzes the imagery and symbols surrounding Daniel Cohn-Bendit and argues that 
the persistence of Cohn-Bendit in the mythology of May is tied to a carefully crafted 
image portraying him as a victim of institutional anti-semitism, a deep-rooted concern in 
French public memory going back to the times of the Vichy government and the Dreyfus 
affair.  
The French feminist movement and its eventual association with May ’68 is the 
central topic of chapter three. For more than ten years, feminism in France was a taboo 
subject for the mainstream media, one that was not acknowledged as a legitimate topic of 
discussion, and by implication, not acknowledged as a concern with broad public interest. 
As this attitude changed, feminism became associated with the events of May ’68, to the 
extent that the origins of radical feminism were often claimed to lie in the student revolts. 
Feminism, gender equality and female sexual liberation quickly became known as the 
greatest accomplishments of May during the 1980s and 1990s. Then a counternarrative 
emerged, according to which May was, if anything, chauvinist, and the (overwhelmingly 
male) student activists of May were not interested as much in women’s liberation as they 
were interested in liberated women. The 40th anniversary celebration of May was colored 
by this conflict, the old narrative of a Feminist May still standing tall, but persistently 
under attack by commentators holding the more sceptical perspective. Chapter three 
traces these changes in feminist narratives to broader social changes in French society as 
well as structural patterns in memory formation. The association of feminism with May 
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can be seen in terms of myth-making, where all events happening in the vicinity of a 
large transformative milestone like May ’68 get conflated with it. The later 
disillusionment, on the other hand, is explained by the emergence of female voices in the 
public sphere who did not idealize May and the liberalization of social norms, which 
made the attitudes of May ’68, even in their mythological form, seem conservative in 
retrospect.  
Chapter four looks at the perceived impact of May through the four subsequent 
decades. By 1978 the sudden social rupture, the break with the norm of 1968 was still 
fresh, leading to narratives emphasizing the violent, revolutionary nature of May. Ten 
years later, as the militant voices of soixante-huitards were dying down, the image of 
May became neutralized, and a parallel narrative of a non-violent, joyful youth upheaval 
emerged, driven largely by Hervé Hamon’s and Patrick Rothman’s immensely popular 
work “Generation” (published in book form and made into a documentary by May’s 
second decennial). The 1990s and 2000s shifted the role of commentators from 
journalists, eye-witnesses and soixante-huitards to sociologists, historians and other 
academics, allowing for the proliferation of different narratives of May. Nevertheless it 
would be wrong to say that May had left the domain of memory completely. Rather May 
persisted, and keeps persisting, on the border of history and memory, sustained by the 
interest in commemoration, kept alive by the possibility of ascribing present-day 
concerns onto a fluid narrative of the past.  
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METHODOLOGY 
Let us imagine a person without memory. We might think of someone like Earl in 
Jonathan Nolan’s short story “Memento Mori”, whose retrograde amnesia prevents him 
from forming any new memories. Although he keeps a list of notes with directions to 
help him navigate his daily affairs, they eventually lead him to a tragic end, because, 
incapable of placing the notes in context with the past, he regularly misinterprets their 
meaning without even realizing it.41  In contrast, imagine a man with perfect memory, 
imagine Funes in Jorge Luis Borges’ eponymous short story, who remembers everything, 
indiscriminately, every nook and crevice of his bedroom, every emotion and experience 
he ever felt, every conversation he ever had. As a result, Funes is almost completely 
incapable of functioning in the world, since “to think is to forget a difference, to 
generalize, to abstract”.42 These two stories illustrate two key traits of memory – the 
inextricable link of the past to the present, and the discriminating eye towards 
generalization, abstraction and omission based on our interests here and now.  
How then is memory different from history, one might ask? History too, as E. H. 
Carr has written, is stuck in the purgatory between past and present. One looks at history 
“through the eyes of his own time, and studies the problems of the past as a key to those 
of the present”.43  History too discriminates, selects and abstracts based on the concerns 
of the historian. Where, then, is the difference? One good answer is provided by David 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Jonathan Nolan, Memento Mori, 
http://www.impulsenine.com/homepage/pages/shortstories/memento_mori.htm 
42Jorge Luis Borges,  “Funes the Memorious” in Ficciones, J. Sturrock, ed, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977, 90 
43 E. H. Carr, What is History?, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1961, 21 
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Lowenthal, in an article on heritage, a seemingly different topic. However, since 
Lowenthal considers heritage to be a tangible form of memory, then we may just as well 
substitute the terms: “[Memory] should not be confused with history. History seeks to 
convince by truth, and succumbs to falsehood. [Memory] exaggerates and omits, candidly 
invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error. Time and hindsight alter 
history, too. But historians' revisions must conform to accepted tenets of evidence. 
[Memory] is more flexibly emended. Historians ignore at professional peril the whole 
corpus of past knowledge that [memory] can airily transgress.”44 
The case of Nolan’s Earl or Borges’ Funes might be of interest to literary critics 
and psychologists, historians on the other hand look at collective memory. By this we 
mean the views of the past held in the present by communities of people, the public 
domain or some other expression of group identity.45 According to Maurice Halbwachs, 
collective memory is what makes individual memory possible and vice versa; it is the 
social thought that contextualizes the individual thought, one could not exist without the 
other.46  The word ‘collective’ should not be understood to mean consensual or even 
coherent; on the contrary, collective memories may be contested, subject to political and 
ideological debate, they may be appropriated both by the state power and by informal 
countercultural institutions. Sometimes collective memories can be directly contradictory. 
But even opposing interpretations of a single event can be part of the same body of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 David Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage” in History and Memory 10/1, 
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45Patrick H Hutton.,  “Memory and Historical Identity” in The Merits of Memory, eds H. 
Grabbe, S. Schneider, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2008, 82 
46 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, 
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collective memory, if they interact in the same interpretive community.47  For instance 
both the idea of American exceptionalism and the rejection of that idea in certain 
socioeconomic or racial groups can still be considered equally legitimate aspect of 
American collective memory, since even the rejection of Tocqueville’s dogmatic idea is 
dependent on recognizing its existence. Though one’s reaction to the concept of 
American exceptionalism may vary depending one’s background, class status, and 
various other structural and individual characteristics, it is nearly impossible to avoid 
interacting with it in an American community, which qualifies it as a staple of American 
historical memory.  
By that token, May 1968 is as surely a part of French collective memory as the 
idea of exceptionalism is part of the American one.  But this truism is certainly not 
satisfying enough to be left uninterrogated.  Why has May become a staple of French 
identity, to the extent that it is commemorated to a degree comparable only to Bastille 
Day, to the extent that a French presidential candidate makes it a founding pillar of his 
campaign, to the extent that forty years of history have not diminished the amount of 
books, dissertations, theses and articles written about it? How do we study it? How does a 
concept as nebulous as ‘collective memory’ crystallize into a form that can be observed, 
probed and evaluated? What are the reasons that cause the memory of ’68 to transform 
into a contested, ideological subject that has produced heated debate for over 40 years? 
The first question is answered with the help of the French historian Pierre Nora. 
In his 7-volume magnum opus, Les Lieux de Mémoire, Nora and other French historians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory” in 
The American Historical Review, 106/3, 
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/106.3/ah000906.html#FOOT34  
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examine staples of French national identity, such as the tricolor flag or the idea of the Sun 
King, from the perspective of collective memory and commemoration. According to 
Nora, elements as diverse as the Bastille Square, Camembert cheese, Joan of Arc and 
Normandy vineyards come together under the term lieux de mémoire, which has been 
roughly (and somewhat inadequately) translated into English as ‘realms of memory’. 
According to Nora, the increasingly fast pace of modernity has caused a disjuncture 
between memory and history, transforming them from parallel concepts to opposing 
ones. Memory, this constantly reinvented, evolving, living construct of the human mind 
has in Nora’s view become the antithesis of the fleeting reconstruction of the past also 
known as history.48 This distinction has an air of romanticism to it and is perhaps not 
quite as radical as Nora would have us believe, but it helps in leading him to the concept 
of the lieu de mémoire. The ‘realm of memory’, according to Nora, is an event, object or 
concept that contains within itself the will to remember and a combination of functional, 
symbolic and material value.49 More significantly, realms of memory “have no referent in 
reality; or, rather, they are their own referent. [---] In this sense, the lieu de mémoire is 
double: a site of excess closed upon itself, concentrated in its own name, but also forever 
open to the full range of its possible significations.”50   
It is easy enough to see how May 1968 fits all of these characteristics. An in-
depth description of the mechanisms that turn May from a historical event into a lieu de 
mémoire would (and in fact does) take up the rest of this thesis, but let us begin with a 
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49 ibid., 19 
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brief summary: materially, May exists in the form of the thousands of posters, books and 
various paraphernalia born out of the student riots that are easily recognizable even today. 
Functionally May was supposed to be a break with history, a rupture that ends the rigid 
bourgeois rule of France and heralds in a new age of liberty and playfulness. Sous les 
pavés, la plage – under the pavement, the beach –  as the saying goes. The failure of this 
immediate goal only solidifies May as a lieu, similarly like the failure of the French 
Revoutionary calendar in Nora’s example makes it more, not less of a lieu: a failure, or 
incomplete success becomes a constant reminder of itself, whereas a success would 
“[melt] into our memorial landscape” and cease to exist as lieu.51 Finally, the symbolic 
status is perhaps the most significant quality that forms it into a realm of memory. As the 
rest of this thesis will show, May has been used to signify everything from the persistence 
and effectiveness of state power to the liberalization of mores. Furthermore, this aspect  
illustrates the other important element of a lieu – its fluidity as a signifier. The staying 
power of May comes from being both grounded in a historical event and open to 
reinterpretation as the interests of succeeding generations change.  
In studying May, we must pay attention to ways in which historical events are 
molded into narratives, in other words, how a past reality is turned into a present story. 
The past does not have a three-part structure, yet “to remember is always to give a 
reading of the past, a reading which requires linguistic skills derived from the traditions 
of explanation and story-telling within a culture”.52 If all history is a literary enterprise, as 
Hayden White has argued, then memory is doubly so, because history, after all, has 	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recourse to “responsibility to the rules of evidence, the relative fullness of narrative 
detail, logical consistency, and the like”, not to mention the self-consciousness that 
recognizes itself as partially illusory.53 Memory adheres to none of these criteria, in fact it 
is more than happy to change, ignore or distort evidence in order conform it to a symbolic 
structure, a certain narrative of perceiving the world or a specific interest in the present.54 
We can expect stories of May ’68 to have easily identifiable protagonists (such as Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit) or well delineated goals (such as sexual and social liberation), which may 
not agree with more rigorous, scholarly analyses of 1968. If such formations can be 
identified, we must then ask: How did they come about? Why those people, why those 
goals, and not others? What were the individual interests and structural forces that 
allowed certain myths about May to become ingrained while washing away others as if 
they had never existed? These questions are central to the entire thesis, but they become 
particularly relevant in discussions of literary form and structure in commemorative 
narratives, key arguments in chapters two and three.  
We now reach the somewhat less philosophical question of methodology. How 
does one study an event of memory? How does a community create meaning? Where 
does the zeitgeist hide itself? As most scholars of memory, Nora and Halbwachs in 
particular, note, ritual plays an important role in reifying collective memory. Sociologist 
Patricia Leavy argues that every subsequent commemoration of September 11 has 
become more than just a remembrance of that tragic autumn day; it is now a 	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Contemporary Readings, eds. B. Fay, P. Pomper & R. Vann, Blackwell: Oxford: 1998, 
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commemoration of all the mythology and symbolism that September 11 has become 
synonymous with – from a rare show of patriotic unity to the War on Terror and the 
curtailment of civil rights in the name of security.55 A commemoration forces us to reflect 
on the historical event itself and through that lens recall all the appropriations and 
reinterpretations of the lieu. Some stories that have almost been forgotten are brought 
once again to the fore of public discourse (the die-hard debate over the 9/11 memorial in 
New York is one example), and conversely, ongoing debates are more firmly tied to the 
symbolism of the event in question. Anniversaries and memorials function as a nexus for 
all the discourses surrounding the original lieu.  
For this reason I have chosen the ten-year anniversaries of May as the focal points 
of my study. 1978, ’88, ’98 and ’08 have all seen an explosion of popular and academic 
literature about May 68. Newspapers have run specials on May in relation to anything – 
politics, society, feminism, film, fashion, and the like. The anniversaries are by far the 
most lucrative sources of information for almost all narratives that May has been 
associated with. Further, they help to focus this study on a few key moments in French 
history that, like 1968 itself, reflect on general trends in French society at the time.  
Answering the second question, how does a community create meaning, is 
somewhat more counter-intuitive. We normally think of memory as something uniquely 
personal. Our memories are our own and no-one else’s, they are a product of our brain 
and the creators of our identity. The idea that we can study shared memory without 
recourse to a lot of personal autobiographies seems preposterous at first. However, 
Maurice Halbwachs notes that a lot of the memories we consider “personal” are in fact 	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borrowed, from newspapers, books, conversations, observations and so on. The body of 
remembrances that are shared and experienced by entire communities makes up 
collective memory.56 In the case of small communities – townships and congregations for 
example – it is easy to locate the source of the collective memories within the shared 
physical and mental space. Factory workers share the same the working habits, inhabit 
the same spaces, have similar relationships to tools, traditions and technologies. In the 
case of large groups, such as the nation, the idea of a shared space becomes less literal, 
however. Here, we speak of ‘imagined communities’, groups of people who never 
interact face-to-face with everyone else in the group, but nevertheless have a sense of 
group identity. They feel they are similar to a number of other people, even though they 
have never met them, and cannot even imagine them in their variety and difference. Still, 
people perceive themselves as belonging to the same group, by virtue of sharing common 
goals, ideals and concepts of the world.57 This group identity is created through the use of 
mass media – first the printing press, then print journalism, the radio, television and 
finally the Internet - allowing the reading public to partake (mostly passively, although 
this is changing with the Internet) in community-wide discourse and to be exposed to 
terms, concepts and ideas that guide the minds of people in similar directions, leading to 
the construction of the ‘imagined community’. Owing to this idea, this thesis will focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Halbwachs, Maurice, On Collective Memory, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, 
48 
57 The term ‘imagined community’ is borrowed, of course, from Benedict Anderson, and 
his groundbreaking work on the modern origins of nationalism. The type of collective 
memory that this thesis is concerned with is very much part of this discourse on national 
identity, as the myths of 1968 under question are very much part of and limited to the 
French community. See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 
1991, 6-8 for discussion of this particular definition 
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on the memories of May created and discussed in mass media: print journalism, 
television, and radio.  
One obvious complication here is that mass media inevitably creates a very 
hierarchic framework for the dissemination of collective memory. The memories of those 
with access to newspapers, the television and other media will inevitably be privileged 
over the memories of the common people. This has led many historians, Marxists in 
particular, to the conclusion that mass media serves primarily as a source of legitimizing 
state authority and protecting the existing order.58 Furthermore, the media provides little 
insight into how the dominant mythology is received – who accepts it, who rejects it, who 
offers competing views and who molds it into something entirely new. Any discourse 
moves on a two-way street, it is not simply graciously given and blindly received; it is, in 
fact, constantly reinterpreted at every opportunity. How could we possibly grasp all of 
these complexities via a simple textual analysis of a limited number of mass media 
outlets? 
The very honest answer is: we cannot, but we can go half way. Recalling Michel 
Foucault, relationships of power are more complicated than orthodox Marxists would 
have us believe, and not every dominating discourse is necessarily one constructed by 
state. The mass media gives us insight – very limited and specific insight, true, but insight 
nonetheless – to the memories of the political opposition, the underprivileged, the 
workers and the students, as well as the government and its various proxies. Furthermore, 
these texts will allow us to see the interplays between competing memories of May, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This is particularly evident in Eric Hobsbawms seminal essay The Invention of 
Tradition. Eric Hobsbawm , “Inventing Traditions”, in The Invention of Tradition, eds. E. 
Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1-15 
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get a better understanding of the dynamics of memory.  It helps that most French 
newspapers are explicitly political: Le Figaro has a history of right-wing nationalism, Le 
Monde is known as the center-left newspaper, and l’Humanité functions as the courier of 
the communist left. The allegiances of French public broadcasting can be just as easily 
traced. Of course, beyond these explicit agendas lay a variety of implicit goals, 
constructed by class, socioeconomic status and a number of other factors. This means that 
often evidence linking specific myths to broad structural forces can be a tenuous and 
speculative process. For this reason, I have tried to stick to clearly identifiable 
connections based on close readings of newspaper texts and broadcast material. However, 
structural factors have to be taken into account, as they are often crucial in determining 
what sort of discourse is allowed public prominence, and what sort of discourse gets 
muffled and prohibited.59 In such cases I have relied heavily on secondary sources, 
sociological studies on French society and culture and key works on French media and 
politics. The importance of such arguments is particularly apparent in chapters three and 
four, which relate changes in the May mythology to broad social transformations in the 
fields of gender equality and youth politics, respectively.  
This thesis is varied and interdisciplinary in its approach. It is interested in the 
formation of memory at the level of literary theory and narrative studies, but also in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This idea is explained in detail and at length in Michel Foucault’s seminal 
methodological work The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972). The exact minutiae of his methodological approach are not always applicable to 
this thesis, nor are they always relevant, however, a key to understanding the connection 
between my approach and his would be to treat mainstream journalistic discourse as a 
discursive field, where certain enunciations are permissible and other are not just 
prohibited, they are unthinkable. The field of permitted thought in journalism is perhaps 
more easily defined than in other discursive fields – it is shaped by the interests of the 
journalists, they socioeconomic status, the perception of what counts as ‘public interest’ – 
also tied to issues of class and tradition, etc. 
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broader sociological context, in a relationship to political interests and class conflict. The 
cases studies presented below attempt to provide a multiplicity of perspectives on the 
commemorations of May. The biggest mistake one could make would be to repeat the 
strategy of the myths under analysis and portray the representations of May as 
homogenous, fundamentally similar phenomena. Ultimately, this thesis aims to incite in 
the reader a profound suspicion for clear-cut tales of historical events and provide a more 
complex, though not necessarily clearer, idea of the narratives of May. It is not a 
comfortable position to be in, but upon reflection, it is perhaps a more honest one.    
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CHAPTER 1: 
REBELS WITH A CAUSE – THE POLITICAL MYTH 
 “Morality. That word does not frighten me. One cannot talk about morality after 
May ‘68”60. With these words, presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy introduced one of 
the longest philippics against May 1968. The speech, delivered at Bercy in April of 2007, 
opened the last stretch of the electoral campaign and became a defining moment of 
Sarkozy’s bid for the presidency. The polarizing effect of his speech is hardly surprising, 
as its content revolved around the controversial promise to “liquidate the heritage of May 
68”.61 Sarkozy claimed that May imposed intellectual and cultural relativism on society, 
dismissed authority, respect and politeness, blurred the borders between good and evil 
and introduced cynicism into society and politics.62 
 Yet this image of a hedonistic and immoral May was intended to stand as a 
metonym for the true heirs of ’68, the contemporary Left, as Sarkozy himself admitted 
later in the speech. Since the primary actors of May were workers and gauchiste students, 
one can easily see why Sarkozy would hold the contemporary Left responsible for what 
were in his view the excesses of 1968. However, the idea of 1968 as a time of unrestraint, 
the radical rejection and demonization of the values of May, was never a permanent 
fixture of the Right’s political rhetoric. Nor has the resolute affirmation of ‘68 by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Nicolas Sarkozy, Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy..., http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001622.html,  
61 ibid. 
62 ibid.  
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mainstream Left in response to Sarkozy’s claim always been the status quo.63 From ’78, 
when the future of France seemed to inevitably contain a Gaullist government, to ’88, 
when the upcoming presidential elections and two years of cohabitation under the 
Mitterand-Chirac Goverment muddied the waters, and onwards, the political 
interpretation of May’s memory remained a dynamic affair. This chapter looks at the 
development of 1968 mythology in the debate between Left and Right. I argue that 
prevailing interpretations were always strongly rooted in the political dynamics of the 
time. At both ends of the political spectrum, May was seen less as an influential cultural 
landmark and more as a symbol of a progressive political revolution. This image of ’68 
was colored by the growing disillusionment with the governmental Left, which caused 
the the conservatives to start portraying May as yet another example of reprehensible 
gauchiste morality and the far Left holding it as yet another betrayed ideal. In this context 
our vantage points, the 10-year anniversaries of ’68, are all the more appropriate, as all 
but one of them were also election years.  
 May 1978. Two months after the French legislative elections. The right-wing 
Presidential Majority had retained a 87-seat lead over the Union of the Left, a loss over 
their 140-seat lead in the previous General Assembly, but a majority nonetheless. The 
politically unaffiliated economist Raymond Barre was hailed as the perfect choice for 
Prime Minister by the Left, Centre and Right, according to an editorial in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See “Mai 68: La gauche tire a boulets rouges sur Sarkozy”, 
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/politique/0,,3438472,00-mai1968-gauche-tire-boulets-rouges-
sur-sarkozy-.html , for a selection of responses to Sarkozy’s speech. A representative 
example is Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s “There is no reason to be ashamed of 68”, a less 
representative, but perhaps more eloquent one is given by Daniel Cohn-Bendit: “I ask 
myself, was he smoking a joint before giving that speech, because that would explain the 
hallucinatory exclamations.”  
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conservative Le Figaro.64 Yet his appointment in 1976 was a product of necessity not of 
reconciliation – as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, France in ‘78 was in the middle of the 
first major economic crisis since World War II. Unemployment was growing and 
inflation was running at 9.5%. Appointing a nominally apolitical economist as Prime 
Minister was supposed to calm the left-wing opposition, while paving the road for a 
number of market-oriented reforms to bring France out of the economic slump. Yet by 
the 1978 election, those policies were too young to produce tangible results, while the 
reorientation from employment-oriented economic policy to inflation control was already 
angering the Left.65 President Valery Giscard d’Estaing felt confident approaching the 
1978 elections, but this view was not widely shared. The Left was consolidating its forces 
and the victory of the Presidential Majority at the legislative elections was considered 
anything but a fait accompli. In this atmosphere, shaped by equal parts of crisis and 
confidence,  the first decennial of May 1968 arrived. 
 What better place to look for the official interpretation of May than the public 
media? Though no longer simply a Gaullist mouthpiece, French television in 1978 was 
still firmly in the hands of the government. A giscardian reform in 1974 had disbanded 
the national television company ORTF, whose role was best described by former minister 
of education, Alain Peyrefitte as the “The government in every dining room.”66 Its 
replacement, a decentralized network of television and radio stations, distributors and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Jean-Jacques Chevalier, Guy Carcassonne & Olivier Duhamel, La Ve République 1958-
2004, Armand Colin: Paris, 2004, 248 
65 See: Rolf E. Wubbels, “The French Economic Miracle: What a Difference Leadership 
Makes,” in Financial Analysts Journal, 35(4), 23-27 for an overview of changes in 
French economic policy in the Barre era.  
66 Alain Peyrefitte quoted in Aude Vassallo, La télévision sous de Gaulle. Le contrôle 
gouvernemental de l'information. 1958/1969, Paris: INA-De Boeck, 2005, 43 
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research archives, was supposedly more liberal, yet all of the organizations were headed 
by directors-general who reported directly to the Prime Minister. Adding to this a 
decades-long tradition of self-censorship, and the fact that French broadcast media 
continued to exist as a state monopoly, one cannot help but conclude that a lot of the 
liberalization happened in name only.67 
 The commemoration of May centered around two big broadcasts that aired on 
prime-time in early May 1978.  A roundtable debate on Antenne 2 discussed the question 
“May 68: Revolt or Revolution?” and a three-part documentary presented an overview of 
the actual events of May. The debate, met with heavy criticism in most centrist and left-
wing publications from Le Monde to l’Humanité, painted a picture of May as an 
unfocused, violent and ultimately failed attempt at a social revolution.68 Although the 
host, Joseph Pasteur, initially introduced May seemingly positively, as a crisis that “no 
one has forgotten. [---] It changed the society in which we live,” it soon became evident 
that this favorable introduction was but a rhetorical device leading to a serious 
condemnation. The portrayal favored by the political right was one that downplayed the 
social and political upheaval in favor of a narrative describing an unfocused youth 
rebellion that provoked a significant yet temporary political crisis, which was swiftly 
subdued by the protective Gaullist government. There was little question that this 
narrative was the one preferred by the producers of the broadcast. Echoing the perceptive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See: Sophie Bachmann, “La suppression de l'ORTF en 1974: La réforme de la 
"Délivrance"” in Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, 17(1), 63-72 for a discussion of the 
reform and the impact on state control of the media. See 69-72 in particular for an 
argument on how the liberalizing efforts were only partially successful in reducing state 
control over broadcasting.  
68 Here and onwards, “La Crise de 68 – Révolte ou Revolution” on Dossiers de l’Écran 
Antenne 2, May 2nd, 1978, INA 
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observation of Alain Krivine, one of two representatives of the Left and the only guest 
with a significant role in the events of 68, the producers failed to invite a single socialist, 
communist or union leader, not even the ubiquitous Daniel Cohn-Bendit.  
 In an environment where the voices of conservative politicians and academics 
overwhelmed the single actual participant of May, the rhetoric became all the more 
jarring. Michel Droit, former favorite of general de Gaulle, argued that unlike the Civil 
Rights movement or the Prague Spring, May in France was “not a revolution. It was too 
vague to be a revolution, it had no movement, no goal. It did not look serious on the 
streets, it looked like a revolt”. The openly partisan host, Joseph Pasteur suggested that a 
silent majority, both in ’68 and ’78 opposed the “incredible violence” of Cohn-Bendit and 
Krivine. 
 May as a failed, violent youth rebellion without results or a clearly defined goal 
appears to be one distinct part of the conservative impression. But it was hardly an 
uncontroversial position, otherwise why even talk about it? The three-part documentary, 
Histoire de Mai, with André Frossard at the helm, sheds some light at the motivations 
behind the conservative memory of May. A key feature of the documentary was the 
selection of interviews with the leaders of the student revolt, but also with the political 
actors of the time, from the ruling Gaullists, to the socialist opposition. And since the 
political establishment of ’68 was mostly the establishment in ’78 as well, the interviews 
provided a very clear picture of the political conjecture of the day.  
 The Right painted itself as completely oblivious to the events of May 1968. 
Jacques Chirac, Minister of the Interior in ‘68, former Prime Minister and head of the 
largest right-wing party in ’78, insisted that in spite of good communication and friendly 
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relations with both the educational system and the labor unions, no-one in the 
government could foresee the events of May.69 Michel Jobert, cabinet secretary to Prime 
Minister Pompidou in ’68, made similar claims in both the documentary and an opinion 
article in le Monde: “And yet, what turmoil! [---] And without anticipation! Not by the by 
the general [De Gaulle], for whom the situation became elusive fast, not for the Prime 
Minister, who left calmly for Afganistan, not for the minister of education, whose 
universities triggered these fireworks.”70 Ironically enough, that very Minister of 
Education, Alain Peyrefitte, appeared in the same documentary, aptly describing the 
miserable living conditions of students at Nanterre, the university where the revolts 
started.71 
 Why did Chirac and Jobert choose to show themselves as ignorant of 
developments so obvious to Peyrefitte? This claim appears to be one half of a narrative of 
stability and order, a claim without which the rest of the narrative makes no sense.  
According to the governmental right, the outcome of May was ultimately as insignificant 
as it was ambitious: the students were pacified, the political Left failed in making a bid 
for the presidency, and the Gaullists returned. The Grenelle Accords – well, that was 
simply a meager compromise in order to appease the workers, with no real outcome.72 
The standing order won and that, in fact, was what made May significant. The moral, 
according to Jobert and Chirac, was that May proved the Gaullist regime capable of 
triumphing even against an unexpected, unforeseen crisis. The political situation at the 
time of the broadcast was only further proof of the stability of the successor regime.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 André Frossard quoted in Histoire de Mai, pt I, Antenne 2, May 7th, 1978, INA 
70 Michel Jobert, “Mai 68 ou la révolution civilisée” in Le Monde, Mai 6, 1978 
71 André Frossard quoted in Histoire de Mai, pt 1 
72 See: Jacques Chirac quoted in, Histoire de Mai, pt 3, Antenne 2, May 21, 1978, INA 
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 Leaving aside the obvious explanation – that politicians rarely admit to mistakes 
or failure – there are a number of reasons that caused the Right in ’78 to gravitate towards 
a view of May as an example of state power and the efficiency of the Gaullist regime. 
The Presidential Majority’s victory against the United Left was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. If anything, it was a surprise. The economic downturn and the unsuccessful 
attempts of Prime Minister Chirac to contain the recession brought considerable support 
to the Socialists and the Communists and disillusioned by the failure of Chirac, many saw 
the liberalizing policies of Prime Minister Barre as further steps down the road to 
perdition.  
The Right was not a homogenous group either. A conservative Gaullist in bed 
with a president in charge of liberalizing French society, Jacques Chirac was both an ally 
and a rival of president Giscard d’Estaing. Chirac’s portrayal of the Gaullists as the party 
of order and stability could be seen equally as an indictment of Giscard d’Estaing, who 
presided over the period of economic instability, and as an indictment of the Left, the 
creators of social instability. Finally, the economic downturn prompted the proliferation 
of many social and political anti-establishment movements that the government had to 
contain. Threats appeared both from the direction of counterculture movements and 
formal political organizations. The working class loubards, young rebels dressed in 
menacing leather jackets, were exemplary products of the oil crisis, distinctly more 
aggressive and malcontent than the revolutionary yet ultimately joyous generation of 
’68.73 The ‘70s also saw the rise of the French far right, namely Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Chris Warne, “La Jeunesse est-elle toujours en crise? The Social Representation of 
Youth under the Fifth Republic” in Forty Years of the Fifth Republic, M. Allison & O. 
Heathcote, eds. Bern: Peter Lang, 1999, 211-212 
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Front Nationale, and its competitor Parti des Nouvelles Forces in 1972 and 1974 
respectively.74 In this state of increasing anxiety, one method for maintaining an 
atmosphere of security was through a discourse of stability and control, a discourse that 
the conservative image of May helped to sustain.  
 At the opposite end of the political spectrum, May appeared very different. Far 
from considering the state’s actions appropriate or even effective, the Left saw ‘68 as an 
indictment of the Gaullist regime that even ten years later could not provide an adequate 
response to the social and political problems that 1968 had underscored. Alain Krivine, 
head of the Revolutionary Communist League, started the  roundtable debate La Crise de 
68 with an immediate attack on the present regime. He raised the issue of Daniel Cohn-
Bendit’s continuing exile, which the Giscardian government had still failed to reverse. He 
invoked a new “silent majority” who had opposed the conduct of De Gaulle during ’68, 
disapproved of the failed social reforms thereafter and disliked the Giscardian 
administration in general. Finally, Krivine noted, the proletariat was being completely 
excluded from the debate – any debate – over the legacy of ’68.75 Put together, his 
comments formed an image of a government out of touch with the people, incapable and 
unwilling to tackle sorely needed social reforms, ignoring those of the underpriviliged 
who let themselves be ignored, and laying down the iron fist on those who would not. 
“What would a worker, one of those whose salaries were raised by 10, sometimes 15 
percent, have said on televison? [---] But there wasn’t one. Would they have opposed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Catherine Fieschi, Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007, 145 
75 “La Crise de 68 – Révolte ou Revolution” 
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quantitative demands with qualitative ones?” wrote an anonymous critic in the French 
communist newspaper L’Humanité76. 
 The Left also rejected the claim that May was unexpected and unpredictable. 
“Thunder, though the first strike may shock us, is never unpredictable nor spontaneous”77 
wrote L’Humanité in their anniversary edition. For the progressives, May was that first 
thunder, itself unpredictable, but signifying a deep and important rupture in the social and 
political fabric of French society, one that even by 1978 was still clearly evident. The 
commemorative headlines in left-wing newspapers usually read something like “’68 – 
The Fight Continues”78 and almost every interview with a representative of the Left – in 
television or in print – made reference to how, if anything, the situation of the proletariat 
was worse, not better, in ’78 than in ’6879. In short, this story is antithetical to the one 
offered by the Right – May was not resolved by De Gaulle, it was merely quelled, the 
problems were ignored and the deep-rooted social rupture remained, boiling under a 
surface of docility even ten years later. 
 The Parti Socialiste and the Parti Communiste had a number of reasons to believe 
that interpretation. How could a revolutionary movement that almost everyone on the left 
had participated in be resolved or even repealed without a change in power? In 1978, 
though they had gained a significant number of supporters, the PS were a long way from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 B.F. “Mai 68 sans les ouvriers,” in L’Humanité, May 3, 1978 
77 René Ballet, “Mai 68: Le Chant Général,” in L’Humanité, May 17 ,1978 
78 An example is “Nous Continuons Le Combat Populaire de Mai ‘68” in L’Humanité, 
May 22, 1978 or “Mai 68 – La symphonie Inachevée” in L’Humanite, Mai 19, 1978 
79 Examples include Georges Seguy, secretary-general of the CGT in “Une Grande 
Anticipation sur l’avenir” in L’Humanité, May 18, 1978 (“There are too many democrats, 
too many workers in France today that underestimate the role of the working class [---] 
like they did in ’68”); or Alain Krivine in “La Crise de 68” on Antenne 2, or Guy Hernier 
in “Nous Continuons le Combat Populaire de Mai 68” in L’Humanité, Mai 22, 1978 (“All 
that I have just said [---] shows how topical the questions posed by 68 still are today”) 
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a legislative majority. Furthermore, ’68 was difficult to separate from the subsequent 
failures of the Left, because most soixantehuitards in ’78 were influential progressive 
leaders. Francois Mitterrand, the leader of the PS in ’78, was the voice of the anti-Gaullist 
opposition in ’68 and Georges Seguy was an influential union spokesperson through both 
decades, just to name two examples. The narrative of May’s failure created a very 
concrete political platform for the PS. 
 Fast forward ten years. The tables had turned and then turned again. In 1981 the 
Socialists won the presidential elections and Francois Mitterand became the first socialist 
president. His victory was short-lived though, two years after being elected he had to start 
compromising on his policies. Nationalization of major industries stopped, full 
employment strategy was abandoned in favor of the franc fort – the strong franc  –  and 
the French government drifted back towards the center. The victory of Chirac in the 1986 
general elections brought about a period of cohabitation, where the country was governed 
by a Socialist president and a Gaullist prime minister. The twentieth anniversary of May 
came alongside the French presidential elections, with the incumbent president Mitterand 
running against his own Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. It is hardly surprising that this air 
of political uncertainty would end up coloring the twentieth anniversary of the largest 
political upheaval in contemporary French history. 
 Even a cursory look at the French media in May 1988 reveals that the focus of the 
debate over May had changed completely. The question “did May change anything” was 
almost totally forgotten. When it did arise, it was posed only rhetorically, to be 
completely disproven immediately thereafter. The introduction to a prime-time debate on 
TF1, Le Procés de Mai 68 was one such example. The narrator painted a picture of 68 
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that would have felt right at home in the company of Chirac and Jobert circa 1978. As 
images of a prosperous and peaceful France were slowly replaced with footage of student 
riots, violence and anarchy we heard a story of a country “led by a prestiguous leader,” 
with “little unemployment, even a shortage of workers, so much that thousands of 
immigrants flock in looking for jobs”. As the International started playing, the narrator 
asked the question: “What bee stung the youth of 1968?”80 But that was not a serious 
question, but rather a mockery, a satire of a hopelessly conservative attitude which by 
1988 had almost completely disappeared. The idea of an unexpected, unpredictable May 
was now generally accepted as an “exaggeration [---] professed by those who surrended 
after the first cobblestone of May was thrown”.81  
 Nor was the impact of May any longer under question. May did change France, 
this assumption had become implicit. The controversy now revolved around two issues: 
What exactly did May change and was that change good?  
 Even here, significant consensus existed. The discussion about May can be 
divided broadly into the cultural domain and the sociopolitical domain. In the cultural 
domain a general consensus existed, according to which May had changed the attitudes 
towards authority. The Right had become “the civilized Right”82, as the Giscardian era 
proved. “Absolute power – even if it is paternal – is no longer tolerated. And the power 
knows it,” wrote Bruno Frappat in an analysis in Le Monde.83 Bernard Kouchner 
described pre-1968 France as an authoritarian France, where every social interaction was 
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pervaded by a sense of hierarchy and rigidity.84 Guy Hocquenhem went even further 
calling pre-May France something “you could not even imagine today”.85 Even the most 
radical critics of May, such as Michel Albert, General Commissioner of Economic 
Planning during the Giscard administration, admitted that the effects of the revolt had 
been profound and far-reaching.86  
 Whether those effects were positive or not, was a different question. The first 
seeds of the Sarkozy tirade were sown here. Annie Kriegel, a former communist who in 
’88 spoke for the Right, summarized a prominent conservative perspective of the 
soixantehuitards’ goals: “The discussion was only one-sided, it only revolved around 
individual genius and liberty. It wanted to tear down the entire system, no more 
orthography, no more term papers, just let everyone express themselves!”87 Another critic 
was even more harsh: “The symbol of 68 is a trash-can. On your head.”88 The 68 
generation went too far, they thought they could conduct a revolution without the 
massacres, the violence and the social ruptures previous revolutions had always incited. 
And they were wrong.89  
 The left, unsurprisingly, saw things in a very different light. Culturally, the 
liberalization of mores and a relaxation of authority was certainly something to be 
celebrated. The expansion of women’s rights, sexual liberation, a heightened sense of 
criticism towards the state were all cited by prominent socialists as victories of 1968. But 
even then, there was a lot of room for discontent. The inconvenient truth for the 	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progressives was that May ’68 had, for all its cultural impact, still been a political failure. 
The revolution had been quelled and the Gaullists remained in power for another decade, 
albeit in a watered-down form. Furthermore, the victory of the Socialists in 1981 had 
been unsatisfying. Mitterrand was a pragmatist, not an ideologue, and this was a problem 
for many on the far left. Henri Fiszbin, like many others, felt that “time had finally put an 
end to all ambitions for fundamental change”.90 His editorial in Le Monde amounted to a 
long criticism of the Left, accusing them of having far too disparate interests, far too 
many undercurrents and too many specific agendas preventing them from forming a 
coherent bloc and accomplishing any real reforms. The brief period of collaboration 
between the PS and the PCF fell apart only two years into the Mitterand presidency, and 
was never restored.91 An entire episode of the documentary Generations was dedicated to 
the collapse of the left post-68, in which prominent leftists, from Alain Krivine to Henri 
Weber, of the Revolutionary Communist League, discussed the reasons why the 
revolution was never fully seized during May ‘68 or afterwards. Their arguments were 
fairly similar to Fiszbin’s – the interests of left-wing groups were too disparate, there was 
no proper organization, the political movement was unfocused and too anarchic.92 In a 
follow-up episode of Generations, Weber argued that the death of Jean Paul Sartre 
symbolized the death of the radical left. The later generations lacked the insight to see the 
causes of poverty and unhappiness in the system and the will to fight the evils of 
capitalism in any real meaningful way93. Of course, this reference was directed as much 
to the Mitterand administration as to the French general public – Mitterand had quickly 	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backed down from his initial agenda of nationalization and centralization, dashing the 
hopes of many who thought of his victory as the overdue triumph of the soixantehuitards. 
Ironically, another interpretation, advanced by the more free-market minded 
commentators in the French media, argued that 1968 went in the wrong direction. The 
mentality of ’68 was the one thing standing in the way of necessary reforms that could 
pull the French economy out of the slump induced by the oil crises. Because of May, 
French society was in a state far worse than it could have been, with unemployment 
skyrocketing, major industries lagging and the economy in a rigid, uncompetitive 
position. One proponent of the ‘wrong turn’ interpretation was Michel Albert, the head of 
the Planning Committe in the last Giscard administration. In his view, other countries 
innovated, while the French simply striked. The slogans that drove ’68 – “Be Realistic – 
demand the impossible” or “Imagination to power”,– turned into obstacles in the 
recessions of the early 70-s and early 80-s, when hard work and enterprise were needed. 
But all the French could give was more hedonism in return for shorter working hours. 
The slogan Albert would have wanted to see but didn’t was: “Under the pavement - 
Enterprise”94. Or, in the words of Bruno Frappat: “May was a hoax that under the cover 
of communalism and friendship paved the way for the individualism and narcissism that 
characterized the 80s”95. Finally, according to writer Patrick Demerain, the human, 
political, ideological and social failure of ’68 laid the groundwork for the appearance and 
relative popularity of extremist organizations, such as Jean-Marie le Pen’s Front 
Nationale.96  	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 What stands out as a remarkable contrast in the 20-year anniversary coverage of 
May, is the silence of the establishment. While ’78 was ripe with commentary by people 
actively engaged in politics, from Chirac to Krivine, ’88 was dominated by journalists 
and ideologues outside the mainstream of political establishment. One obvious 
explanation is the increased consensus in French public discourse. The social and cultural 
impact of May had become apparent and had been widely accepted, and the distance 
between the present generation and the soixantehuitards was already large enough, that 
the points of contention no longer made as potent political weapons. With that in mind, 
we still have to admit that many soixantehuitards were still active in the political sphere. 
In fact, one of them happened to be president. Their silence requires a more thorough 
explanation. 
It is likely that the precarious political situation of the time contributed to the 
silence of the establishment.. The Parti Socialiste was doubly constrained. It had drifted 
more and more to the center, with the government freezing wages, adopting economic 
austerity packages and following a course of European integration, not to mention the 
party’s changed orientation from Socialist to Social-Democratic in 1985.97 It had also 
endured two years of cohabitation with the right-wing UDF and prime minister Jacques 
Chirac, who by 1988 had become Mitterrand’s primary contender for the office of 
President. Mitterrand had to consider both his voters, who by 1988 were less and less 
likely to accept any radical statements (that Mitterrand was unlikely to proclaim in any 
case), and his unlikely partners in the UDF, who in the early phases of the presidential 	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campaign appeared far less likely to lose the presidency and the parliamentary majority 
as they ultimately did. It was a difficult balance to maintain, and Mitterrand’s strategy 
was to play it safe and portray himself as a modest statesman, carrying on with his duties 
without polemicizing.98 The silence of the president and his party was well in line with 
their timidity on other contentious affairs.  
 Meanwhile, those without such concerns spoke all the more loudly. Critizing the 
Left for overreaching with May was no longer an effective strategy, because the 
widespread effects of May had simply become all too evident and all too accepted. A 
socialist president was in power, contraception, social liberalism and feminism were the 
words of the day and the days of Gaullist continuity seemed long past. The alternative – 
blaming the rise of the Left in 1981 and the ensuing economic U-turn in 1982-1983 on 
ripple effects caused by the self-involved and work-averse generation of ’68 – hit two 
birds with one stone. It cleared the hard-working, enterpreneurial conservatives of any 
blame in ending the French miracle of decades-long uninterrupted economic growth and 
it re-established the belief in authority and order that the Right perceived as being under a 
threat of dissolution in the sea of relativism.  
 The far left on the other hand was equally displeased. The policy of austerity and 
rigeur enacted in 1983 had alienated intellectuals and artists from the Parti Socialiste, 
adding their voices to a growing number of left-wing discontents that already included 
the yet again oppositionary Parti Communiste, not to mention seriously disappointed 
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revolutionary organizations like Alain Krivine’s Revolutionary Communist League.99 
Strong socialist reforms of the early 1980s had been replaced with economic and social 
pragmatism, and had led to a point where the socialist government was enacting 
widespread liberalizing reforms and even President Mitterrand was claiming that the 
French social system was too rigid for innovative entrepreneurialism.100 The illusion of a 
united Left, strengthened by long years in the opposition, was shattered by the realities of 
governance. It is entirely understandable, that much of the criticism levied at May also 
reflected the criticism hurled at the Mitterrand administration and reflected the general 
disorder and disillusionment within the Left. The revolutionaries of ’68 lacked a unifying 
goal, an action plan, a spirit of cooperation, a faithfulness in their ideals – just like the 
reformers of ’88. The post-May decade of continued Gaullist rule diluted what little 
remained of the revolutionary spirit, culminating in the disappointing reign of the 
Mitterand administration. The radical left saw the university strikes of 1986 as a perfect 
example of the failure of revolutionary ideals. “May 68 – We change the world. May 86 – 
We replace our kitchens” was the ironic comment made by Henri Weber in Procés de 
Mai.101 1968 had become a reminder of long lost ideals, the legacy of a radical generation 
replaced by a complacent and docile one.   
 Disillusionment was still the word of the day in 1998. Another was ‘paradox’. On 
the one hand, there was an explosion of literature, articles, televised programs and radio 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 For an overview of the disillusionment of left intellectuals, see Pinto, Diana, “The Left, 
The Intellectuals and Culture,” in The Mitterand Experiment: Continuity and Change in 
Modern France, G. Ross, S. Hoffmann & S. Malzacher, eds. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, 217-228 
100 Cole, Alastair M., “La France Unie? Francois Mitterand,” in The French Presidential 
Elections of 1988, J. Gaffney, ed, Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1989, 85 
101 Procés de Mai 68, TF1 
 45	  
broadcasts dedicated to ’68. Everyone was writing about ’68. Le Monde had an section 
devoted to the memory of ’68 every day in May. L’Humanité issued a 40-page special 
edition dedicated to May. Even the conservative Le Figaro, which barely touched on 
May in ’78 and devoted significantly less space to the commemoration in ’88 than its 
more progressive competitors ran special editions and editorials dedicated to May 1968. 
Yet, like a decade before, the commemorations were limited to a very select group of 
actors – the intellectuals, the journalists and a few on the radical left. The public and the 
establishment, for all intents and purposes, no longer cared. The editorials, more than 
ever noted that May had turned from an event of memory to an event of history. “What 
then has passed? Quite simply, a generation,” exclaimed an op-ed in Le Monde102. And 
this was meant literally – by 1998 many of the “great men” of May had passed away – 
Georges Marchais, Francois Mitterand, Georges Pompidou and Benoit Frachon were the 
men who made ’68 relevant, whose careers took off with May. Without them, May no 
longer had relevance, another Le Monde article stated.103  “The Right stays silent and the 
majority is only a little less reticent,” a third article concluded.104 
 The paradox lies in the contrast between the assessment of May’s legacy and the 
content of what was actually written during the third decennial. Supposing – for a 
moment – that the articles were correct in their evaluations, and people were indeed tired 
of May, then the content of the articles and television broadcasts was surprisingly 
polemical even by the elevated standards of May’s commemorations. The third decennial 
seemed almost like a return to the atmosphere of the first ten-year-anniversary, when the 	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Left was cohesive and the Right content in their place of power. The roots of the 
‘Sarkozy interpretation’ were clearly growing stronger. The consensus on the social 
victories of May was gone, the liberal critics had become more vituperative and the 
progressive inheritors of May more disillusioned. The confusion and murkiness of the 
Mitterand era was waning, and battle lines were being drawn again.  
 The ’wrong turn’ interpretation that took its baby steps in the late 80s returned 
with a vengeance in ’98. No longer did critics concede the positive social effects of May. 
The Gaullist Maurice Druon called May an outright disease. “Does one invite their family 
and friends to celebrate thirty years of menningitis?”105 According to that interpretation, 
echoed by many a liberal on the pages of Le Figaro, Le Monde or in the course of various 
TV-debates, May was a chaotic rebellion, without any philosophical basis or positive 
result. “The cobblestones have disappeared,” wrote Bruno Gollnisch, member of the far-
right Front National, “but subversion has paved its way, served by the same people, 
exhibiting the same cynicism, imposing with the same arrogance”.106 Economically, May 
was criticized for opposing the ‘enterprising spirit’ of free-market capitalism. 1968 was 
destructive, rather than creative.107 The liberal commentator Jean-Claude Casanova 
completed the attack, by flushing the social and cultural achievements of May down the 
toilet: “The universities are autonomous in theory only. [---]And morality, [---] in what 
way did May play a significant role in any of that? [---] Homosexuality is now accepted 
everywhere from Calabria to Iceland!”108  
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 The Left was disillusioned too. Two interpretations prevailed: one that claimed 
that May was left unfinished, was betrayed by its inheritors and left France in a worse 
state than before, and the slightly less apocalyptic notion that May was a utopian idea to 
begin with. The latter was centered mainly around a number of seemingly apolitical 
sociologists and the revolutionary-cum-ecologist Daniel Cohn-Bendit. We will explore 
this undercurrent in more depth in subsequent chapters. The view of May as an “unseized 
heritage” dominated the unions, the far left and the PS. “We are worse off now than in 
’68.” This simple sentence, uttered by CGT activist Aimé Halberer in a TF2 news 
broadcast, summed up the general attitude of many leftists.109 The people behind ’68 had 
betrayed its cause – Mitterrand was a disappointment, Daniel Cohn-Bendit had renounced 
the revolution and become a politician, Alain Geismar too had become a member of the 
government. The revolution was simply no longer on the agenda, even though society 
was worse off than 30 years before.110 
 Given this state of disillusionment, the real question on everyone’s mind was: 
Does France need another ’68? The communist newspaper L’Humanité posed a similar 
question to a number of progressive philosophers in their commemorative special edition 
and the answer was a hesitating “yes, but not quite like that”.111 Pierre Zarka, editor-in-
chief of the journal, concluded: “Put simply, the [problems raised by ‘68] are even more 
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acute now than they were then.”112 Meanwhile, the far Left was lamenting the lost 
revolutionary cause, but offering little in its place and the PS simply remained silent.113 
 The hesitation of the Left is not hard to understand. The past ten years had been 
turbulent – the “official” left, the Parti Socialiste had gone from triumph to despair, from 
winning a landslide victory at the 1988 elections, to an even more uneven cohabitation in 
1990. The socialists ultimately lost the presidency to their long-time rival Jacques Chirac, 
and their surprise return in 1997 resulted in very few truly progressive policies. The 35-
hour workweek was Lionel Jospins government’s one major claim to fame, but it was 
hardly uncontested – its effects on rising unemployment were not nearly as evident as the 
Socialists had predicted.114  Otherwise, the Jospin government was, if anything, liberal – 
it continued the de facto privatization of national industries and pursued a course of 
European integration. The governmental left no longer resembled the Left of the 1970s or 
even the 1980s, creating a feeling of betrayal and hopelessness within the radical left. The 
Revolution had died, both at home and abroad (after all, one should not forget that 
between 1988 and 1998 there was 1989 and 1991) and in spite of a long history of 
governance, the PS had failed to resolve many of the problems that the progressives had 
fought ever since ’68.  
 The debate on the Right, meanwhile, was dominated by some of the more radical 
orators. As Le Monde correctly noted, the governmental parties stayed silent. Those 	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members of RPR and UDF who actually spoke, such as Eduard Balladur, former prime 
minister during the second Mitterand cohabitation, were rather moderate.115 The scene 
was dominated by the more radical free marketeers and the non-governmental Right, 
including members of the unexpectedly popular far right Front National. In short, given 
that French social and economic policy at the time had an air of compromise to it, the 
country was facing a growing influx of immigrants and a contentious European 
intergration plan, it is only natural that there would be a number of serious discontents on 
the Right as well as on the Left. The rise of radicalism, primarily on the Right was a 
permanent fixture of the late 1980-s and 90-s. It has even sometimes been associated with 
the legacy of May, but also, somewhat more convincingly, with a liberalization of 
immigration politics during the Mitterand years and a strengthening of non-French 
identities.116 In this climate of conflict and radicalism, a more polemic tone on both sides 
of the debate was hardly surprising.  
 “Morality. That word does not frighten me. One cannot talk about morality after 
May ‘68”117. There really is no way around that speech in any contemporary debate on 
May. All discussions in 2008 were framed by it. Almost every other article or broadcast 
made reference to Sarkozy, sometimes explicitly sometimes covertly. It was perhaps 
incidental that almost every news story of May’s 40-year anniversary on FR2 and FR3 
was preceded by an unfavorable story on the hyperactive French president, but it 
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certainly lucidly illustrated the link between ’68 and ’08. The 40-year anniversary of May 
was a political event.118 
 What Sarkozy’s monumental speech amounted to was in fact a restatement of the 
increasingly critical discourse that had been growing amongst the conservatives since the 
Mitterand era taken to a new level of vituperation. The ’wrong turn’ themes resurfaced 
yet again: individualism, liberty at the expense of hard work, cynicism, undue exaltation 
and moral relativism, all “values of ‘68” that had caused evils in French society ranging 
from the oppression of the workers by the left to the rise of predatory capitalism and 
exposive financial bubbles. The Left had turned into an aristocracy that professed 
equality and public support, but never took the public transport and never visited the 
underprivileged suburbs.119 Sarkozy’s May was a catch-all term that could just as well be 
substituted to mean “everything that is wrong with French society”. 
Remarkably, Sarkozy managed to revive a debate that only ten years ago seemed 
to be relegated to the domain of intellectuals, academics, arm-chair ideologues and a few 
die-hard soixantehuitards. The immediate backlash from his rival, the Socialist Ségolene 
Royal unsurprisingly attempted to restore the idea of May as a positive force in French 
society. The socialist candidate called Sarkozy’s speech “extremely violent” and noted 
the many positive outcomes of May, such as the Grenelle Accords, women’s rights to 
contraception and a liberalization of societal norms.120 The discussion at the break of 
May’s 40th anniversary turned back to an affirmation of May’s positive values, but not so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See Actualités a 1920H, France-3, April 30, 2008; Actualités a 2000H, France-2, May 
3, 2008 or Actualités a 1215H, France-3, May 2, 2008 for examples 
119 Nicolas Sarkozy, Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy..., 
120 “Ségolène Royal rappelle "les formidables avancées de mai 68"” in iFrance, April 30, 
2007, http://web.ifrance.com/actu/france/97770,  
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much in describing what May accomplished, but in affirming that May did not 
accomplish all the things Sarkozy ascribed to it. “May can be summed up in a single 
goal: To make the Sarkozys impossible. [---] The spirit of ’68 is to think that you have to 
be a moron to want to become president of the Republic. It’s the idea of politics as a 
collective invention and not as a rise to power,” said the socialist philosopher Jaques 
Ranciére in an interview to Libération.121 The two major broadcasts on the heritage of ’68 
both began by contrasting Sarkozy’s speech to opposing views, usually those of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit.122 
 At the same time, the currents that shaped the memory of ’68 on the Left since the 
Mitterand times were still persistent. Grégory Marin, a journalist in L’Humanité lamented 
that the real youth activism today takes place on the right and that, in a sense, the 
Sarkozysts have appropriated May, while simultaneously denouncing it.123 He, as well as 
others, lay the blame for diluting the heritage of May on the Left itself, from the 
conciliatory policies of Francois Mitterand and the failure of the socialist administration 
to bring about a new social order, to the “Cohn-Bendits, Sauvageouts, Glucksmanns and 
others who have turned it into a play on the streets of Paris that they wanted to stay the 
stars of”.124 Though the social and cultural effects of May were undeniable, the very 
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possibility of someone like Sarkozy claiming power symbolized for the Left the ultimate 
political failure of May and underlined that the battle still continued. 
 The political discourse surrounding the memory of May 1968 was shaped by three 
currents that at first may seem paradoxical and self-contradictory. Growing 
disillusionment within the Left brewed scepticism and weariness that made the lofty 
radical aspirations of May seem more and more like a utopia destined to failure, than a 
legitimate attempt at social change. The failure of the Mitterand administration to curb 
what was perceived by the Left as capitalist excesses was reflected in the progressives’ 
reluctance to evaluate May as a success. The ascendance of Chirac and ever-increasing 
liberalization of the 1990s and 2000s only exacerbated these sentiments. Yet 
paradoxically, while post-May politics only underlined its failure, structural changes in 
French society made the impact of May increasingly harder to ignore. The conservative 
narrative changed from an outright denial of May in 1978 to a hesitating acceptance of its 
social effects in the subsequent decades, culminating finally in the ‘wrong turn’ narrative, 
according to which the consequences of May were wide and far-reaching, but also the 
source of all the ills in French society. Finally, the four post-May decades demonstrate an 
increasing historicization of May. 1968 has remained an integral part of public discourse, 
and judging solely on the number of pages published on the subject, one could argue that 
interest in May has, if anything, increased. However, one can also observe a change in 
focus as well as a change in authorship. The deeply politicized debate about the merits of 
May itself in 1978 turned into a discourse on its heritage held mainly by historians, 
journalists and die-hard soixantehuitards in 1998. In this light, Sarkozy’s campaign 
speech can be seen as an attempt at a generational break, a desire to show that 40 years 
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later, 1968 had finally become a thing of the past and that time had come to move on. 
Yet, ironically, this very decision proved enough to return May to memory again (from 
which it had never really left). Perhaps these very contradictions, the persistence of 
May’s social effects and the permanent reminders of its political failure, the passing into 
history of ’68 itself and the ubiquitous presence of its heritage, that have kept May in the 
cycle of memory and history in French political culture.125 
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CHAPTER 2: 
COHN-BENDIT VIRUS – THE HERO MYTH 
 Daniel Cohn-Bendit left Paris on May 10th 1968. He was exiled from France 
twelve days later. “Dany the Red”, the star of the May revolts, whose persona has been 
the front and center of almost every discussion, debate, re- and overview of May for forty 
years, was not even present for most of the action. Yet it is almost impossible to find a 
single broadcast, article or interview about May ‘68, where Cohn-Bendit does not occupy 
the center stage. Sometimes one gets the impression that he is, in fact, more important 
than all the events of May put together. La Crise de 68, a television debate aired at the 
10th anniversary of May turned from a scholarly dialogue on the legacy of ’68 into a 
heated, vociferous battle the moment Daniel Cohn-Bendit was mentioned., The panelists 
spent almost as much time fighting over the issue of Cohn-Bendit’s continuing exile than 
discussing the actual topic of the broadcast – the legacy of May.126 There like in many 
other debates, no matter the decade, the unfaltering smirk of Dany the Red dominated the 
memory of ’68. Asking the question “What is the legacy of May in France ?” inevitably 
meant asking the question “Well, what does Daniel Cohn-Bendit think it is?” 
 Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s status as a personification of May has become the subject 
of intense scholarly debate. Some see him as the archetypal rebel without a cause 
symbolizing the corruption of May’s legacy, the deformation of a broad social and 
cultural movement into an aimless, meaningless rebellion against any authority. “For 
some, May was uniquely a student revolt, the students were just Nanterre students, 
Nanterre was just the “March 22nd” group and the latter was just Daniel Cohn-Bendit. [--	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-] Wasn’t it all better than that?”127 Others suggest that Dany was a charismatic leader 
who brought the various threads of ’68 together in one personality. He was identified 
with both marxists and anarchists, cultural and political revolutionaries, he was both a 
champion of the revolution (before he proclaimed it dead) and an embodiment of the 
playful, liberating slogans that have kept alive the memory of May as a month-long party 
on the streets of Paris.128 He was associated with interrupting the French minister of 
sports and youth affairs with requests for free access to girls’ dormitories,129 but also with 
the unabashedly critical public outcry of “We are all German Jews”, which rang through 
the streets of Paris after he was denied reentry to France on May 22nd. 
 Instead of joining the increasingly large chorus of scholars discussing whether 
Cohn-Bendit deserves his place in the mythology of May, this chapter will investigate 
how he managed to assume and maintain his mantle as the living symbol of May for four 
decades. His own active role in perpetuating his myth and appropriating it to serve his 
personal ambitions as a politician, ideologue and ultimately a leader of the European 
Green Movement provides a part of the answer – but only a part. The missing elements 
are supplied by the symbolic ties Cohn-Bendit’s limited but influential role has to long-
standing elements of French collective memory, most notably the revolutionary tradition 
and the issue of anti-semitism. By this account, Dany the Red is not simply a symbol of 
May, but also a reminder of the Dreyfus affair and the French Revolution. Specifically, 	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the narrative of Daniel Cohn-Bendit as a victim of institutonalized anti-semitism has to 
be situated in the context of a long-standing tension between liberal reformers and die-
hard anti-semites, which has colored many milestone events in recent French history, 
from the Dreyfus affair to the Vichy regime. Finally, we will look at Cohn-Bendit as the 
trickster figure in the May mythology and consider how the use of this literary archetype 
has further solidified his position in French public memory. 
 What exactly was it then, that propelled Daniel Cohn-Bendit to fame in just a few 
short months in the spring of 1968? As with many other soixantehuitards, his career 
began at the University of Nanterre, or Nanterre The Folly as it was colloquially 
known.130 Nanterre was a depressing showcase of the development of the French 
university system in the 1960-s. It was meant to be the first major university in the Paris 
region to emulate the cohesiveness and unity of American campuses. It was meant to be 
the first major French insitution of the humanities to showcase the social sciences. 
Finally, it was meant to be cheap and big. The result was almost universally regarded as a 
disaster, hence its pejorative nickname. The campus was impersonal and opressive. 
University buildings, mostly ubiquitous blocks of steel and concrete, were windowless 
and drab. The lectures were overcrowded, as the student population of Nanterre had 
almost tripled in three years, reaching 11 000 students by 1967. There were few places 
for social interaction and leisure. The contrast with the prestigious universities in the 
middle of the historic Latin Quarter was striking. The student body was economically 
disparate, consisting of lower-income and middle class students, with a disproportionate 
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number of the ultra-rich creating a painful contrast.131 These conditions easily turned 
Nanterre into a hotbed for various left-wing, anarchist or simply revolutionary 
movements.  
 Moving between these various radicals was Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a sociology 
student who quickly made a name for himself with his eloquent radicalism and consistent 
defiance of authority. He attained national fame in January 1968 by calling out the 
French minister of Youth and Sports, Francois Missoffe for ignoring the issue of 
sexuality in his white paper on youth problems. Missoffe, who had come to Nanterre to 
inaugarate a swimming pool, retorted by suggesting that Cohn-Bendit jump into it. Not 
one to concede the last word, Cohn-Bendit pushed back by saying: “Now there’s an 
answer worthy of Hitler’s youth minister.”132  
The issue quickly made it into national media, as minister Missoffe suggested that 
Cohn-Bendit be expelled from Nanterre for his radical behavior. The issue was 
complicated by rumors suggesting that minister Missoffe’s anger was really motivated by 
a secret affair Cohn-Bendit was having with the minister’s daughter, also a student at 
Nanterre.133  While the French government debated his expulsion, and the media rumor-
mill kept Cohn-Bendit in the spotlight, the young anarchist continued his involvement in 
subversive activities, most notably the Movement of 22 March. The radical group was a 
community grown out of a group of five hundred students who occupied a faculty lounge 	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during the night of March 22nd.134 Cohn-Bendit’s continuing defiance of authority and 
participation in anarchist and libertarian activities made him a student idol, even as his 
expulsion was being discussed at the highest level.135 
Seen in the context of the Movement’s prior activities, Cohn-Bendit’s decision to 
organize a celebration of the “national anti-imperialism day” on May 2nd was just 
another rebellious adventure in a long list of transgressions. However, as it turned out, the 
anti-imperialism day became the opening shot in the events of the May revolt. In reaction 
to the popularity of the anti-imperialist day, Dean Pierre Grappin decided, not for the first 
time, to close down the University in order to prevent further demonstrations. The 
Movement, along with the French National Students Union (UNEF) decided to call a 
demonstration at the Sorbonne the following day. And so, May had begun.136 
Over the course of the next several days, Daniel Cohn-Bendit emerged as one of 
the leading speakers for the students at the occupied Sorbonne, along with Jacques 
Sauvageot of the UNEF and Alain Geismar of the National Union of Higher Education 
(SNESup). The media focused their attention on Cohn-Bendit, who provided the material 
for at least two of May’s iconic memes - a photograph of him laughing in the face of an 
on-coming police officer, and the chant “We are all German Jews” which originated as a 
response to questions about his non-French origin. Politically, on the other hand, Cohn-
Bendit was by far the most moderate, and his influence was quickly overshadowed by the 
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activism of Geismar and Sauvageot.137 Cohn-Bendit, who had vocally expressed his 
discontent with the CGT, the worker’s union, quickly came into conflict with both the 
workers’ leaders and his student comrades, who were looking for ways of collaborating 
with the CGT.138 Seeing his influence fade, Cohn-Bendit and his supporters in the 
Movement of March 22nd left Paris two weeks into the revolt, and after a brief visit to 
Germany Dany the Red was prohibited from entering France. This marked, to the great 
outrage of the student movement in Paris, the start of what would become his 10-year 
exile.139 
Cohn-Bendit’s contribution to the revolt was more symbolic than real. The 
Movement’s greatest achievement was igniting the student movement with the “anti-
imperialist day” that ultimately led to the occupation of the Sorbonne. But even as 
catalysts of May, their role did not remain uncontested. According to Maurice Grimaud, 
the prefect of Paris during the revolt, if Nanterre had not provoked the crisis, something 
else would have.140 Furthermore, the UNEF was at least as instrumental as the Movement 
in ensuring that the revolt did not simply stop with Dean Grappin’s decision to close 
down Nanterre, but continued at Sorbonne the following day.141 Taking into 
consideration the relatively minor role Cohn-Bendit played in directing the course of the 
revolt (he was, for instance, opposed to barricading the streets), at least compared to 
Geismar and Sauvageot, it quickly follows that Cohn-Bendit’s actual role in the student 
movement was not nearly as large as he made it out to be. Finally, to fixate too closely on 	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the personalities of the three student leaders would inevitably mean deemphasizing the 
spontaneous and unpredictable nature of May, an element acknowledged by almost 
everyone, soixante-huitard or scholar.  
May, of course, was about much more than just the student riots. Cohn-Bendit had 
almost no connection to the general strike (by the time the strikes started on May 10th, 
Cohn-Bendit was already leaving Paris). He missed DeGaulle’s absence, the schism 
within the Left, counter-demonstrations by the Right, the end of the revolt and the 
Grenelle accords. It is hard to see how, taking all of this into account, one could argue 
that he was the most significant personality of May. Yet it seems that in the French 
memory, Cohn-Bendit is ’68. 
 The secret of Cohn-Bendit’s continued presence in French memory extends 
further than just the events of May. His controversial exile continued for a decade, most 
of which he spent working in a kindergarten in Frankfurt.142 After the ban was lifted in 
’77, Cohn-Bendit returned for a brief visit on French Television, after which the Ministry 
of the Interior quickly reinstated the ban.143 The public outcry that followed was evidence 
that the ban could no longer be sustained, and Cohn-Bendit was allowed to return, this 
time for good, in 1978.  
 Yet Cohn-Bendit decided to stay in Frankfurt, and his influence radiated to France 
mainly through numerous interviews, books and articles that reflected on his role in the 
May revolts. The first sign of his return to public life was his decision to join the German 
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Green Party in 1984.144 This was, however, just the preface to his big comeback: in 1986 
he published Nous l’avons tant aimée, la Révolution, a nostalgic look back at the 
personalities of 1968, simultaneously with a four-part television documentary that aired 
to an unsurprisingly large auditorium.145 There Cohn-Bendit rejected the revolutionary 
aspirations of the ’68 generation as misguided and unrealistic from the very beginning, 
and redefined himself as a moderate, looking to reform the European political system 
through a controlled free market and a few 68-inspired policies (mostly having to do with 
increasing the role of unions and vague notions of autogestion – workers’ self-
management).146 This made him effectively the first prominent soixantehuitard to not 
only admit to the political failure of the revolution, but also to denounce it strongly and 
decisively as a false step in the first place.  
 In the following years, Cohn-Bendit’s focus briefly shifted away from France, as 
he spent his time producing a television talk show in Switzerland and climbing the 
political ladder of the green party. He was elected to the European Parliament as a 
member of the German Greens in 1993, after which he made his second comeback in 
France as a member of the Greens. He won a seat at the European Parliament in 1999 
with the highest percentage of votes ever cast for a Green party member.147 His continued 
popularity and doubly controversial reputation as both a staunch pro-Europeanist and a 
soixantehuitard made him a media favorite, and his popularity was further proven by the 
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unprecedented 19% electoral share of his Green Party at the 2009 European elections, 
losing second place to the Socialists by a margin of less than a percent.  
 Ascribing Cohn-Bendit’s lasting popularity to his own manipulation of the media 
is a compelling argument – and one that we will return to further on – but certainly not 
sufficient to completely explain his singular role in the mythology of ’68. He had little 
input in shaping his image in the French media until ’78, given his exile, and even after 
then was fairly passive in shaping his image until the publication of Nous l’avons tant 
aimée.... No, we must start with his role in ’68 and examine what it was that made Cohn-
Bendit more memorable than other leaders of May and held him on the scene until his 
return in ’78. 
 A look at the commemorations of May reveal three main themes that crop up time 
and again in discussing Cohn-Bendit: His vague political ideology, his ethnicity as a 
German Jew living in France, and his deportation on May 22nd combined with the fact 
that it lasted for 10 years.  
First the question of ideology: Cohn-Bendit’s political position has always been 
unclear, to say the least. Keith Reader describes the 22nd March Movement as a Leninist 
group of anarcho-syndicalists with a penchant for Third World models of direct action.148 
Michael Seidman uses terms like “anarchist”, “libertarian” and “situationist” to describe 
Dany the Rouge.149 Yes, Cohn-Bendit was clearly a radical leftist, but little else can 
confidently be said about his ideological position. In fact, it seems that a defiance of 
ideological compartmentalizing was a key element in his philosophy, alongside a 	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persistent distaste of authority and a call for autogestion. Calling him an anarchist is 
perhaps then quite apt. 
Cohn-Bendit’s fuzzy ideology played to his advantage in a number of ways. The 
Gaullists and conservative historians found it easy to interpret vagueness for vacuity, and 
paint a picture of May as a classic case of barbarians at the gate, with Cohn-Bendit 
leading the horde. “When civilizations reach a certain point of self-centeredness, the 
barbarians come,” narrated André Frossard in a 1978 documentary, as the viewer was 
treated to an image of Cohn-Bendit at the head of a mass of students on the streets of 
Paris.150 Another image, also advanced by Frossard was that of the Tower of Babel, also 
fitting for Cohn-Bendit, with his unrefined ideological stance that seemed to rest on chaos 
and defiance of authority.151 For those more sympathetic to Cohn-Bendit’s cause, his 
anarchism was interpreted as a symbiosis of various left-wing forces that came together 
under the banner of May.152 He was the symbol of “uninstitutionalized 
revolutionaries”.153 This, of course, was the interpretation that Cohn-Bendit himself 
supported: “To say that May was a gauchiste movement is wrong. To say that it wasn’t is 
also wrong.”154 Finally, as the memory of May faded and the details of the events became 
more and more unclear, Cohn-Bendit offered exactly the sort of balance Pierre Nora talks 
about in his Lieux de Mémoire – distinct enough to make a lasting impression, but vague 
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enough to leave room for creative interpretation.155 Once the memory of May, at least for 
a large part of the post-1968 generations, had boiled down to “It was vague, but it was 
good”,156 Daniel Cohn-Bendit became an excellent vehicle for this memory; his role in 
the events, after all, could be summed up in these exact same words. 
It was, however, his ethnicity that cemented him as a centerpiece in the May 
events. Cohn-Bendit was a German Jew, born in France during World War II as his 
parents had fled Germany in 1933. Officially without citizenship, Cohn-Bendit chose 
German citizenship at the of 14, yet after going to high school in Frankfurt, returned to 
France for university studies. His Jewish identity has been an inextricable part of his 
persona ever since he propelled himself to fame by comparing the French minister of 
sports and youth affairs to a Nazi. In fact, almost every memorable aspect of his actions 
during May can be related to his Jewish origins.  
This turned Cohn-Bendit into a confluence of many important strands of French 
collective memory. The question of French anti-semitism, which the question of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit inevitably symbolized, has ties to a number of historical events and trends. 
We will consider two that have concretely been invoked in Cohn-Bendit’s case: the 
Dreyfus affair and the Vichy regime. But first, we have to situate these events in the 
context of French xenophobia and anti-semitism. 
Pierre Birnbaum traces the roots of French anti-semitism to the overwhelmingly 
Catholic composition of the country, which had prevented Jews from establishing a firm 
identity capable of disspelling prevalent stereotypes of Jewishness. “Jewish memory is 	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inscribed into the profoundly catholique French landscape filled with chruches and 
abbeys only as an exception.”157 In the political mythology, rich capitalist Jews and 
revolutionary Jews are both unfavorable to frugal and conservative Catholic dogma.158 
Though French Jews have been able – often through a rejection of their Jewish identity 
and outright assimilation – to strive in the elites of French society with increasing 
success, the underlying sense of precariousness is everpresent, symbolized in French 
memory by none other than the Dreyfus Affair.159  
The Dreyfus Affair established many of the tropes that continue to resonate in 
French discourse of anti-semitism. In 1894 Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the 
French army, was wrongly accused of delivering state secrets to Germany. However, 
instead of exonerating the Captain from blame once the evidence proving his innocence 
came to light, the French government attempted to blame him of even further treason, 
based on new, equally fabricated evidence. This culminated with a powerful public 
campaign lead by writer Emile Zola finally forcing the French government to give in and 
reinstate Dreyfus to the military.  
The very crude parallel with Daniel Cohn-Bendit is easy to see: the opposition 
between the French state and an individual with relatively little power is an almost 
grotesquely exaggerated version of the David and Goliath myth. In Dreyfus’ case, the 
charges were made-up, in Cohn-Bendit’s case, they were disproportionate. However, the 
relationship between Dreyfus and Cohn-Bendit is more complicated than that. For some 
on the right, the student protests led at Sorbonne by Cohn-Bendit were a perversion of 	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similar demonstrations undertaken by student Dreyfusards. “[The Dreyfusard student 
protests] had a clearly defined goal: Defending the sense of justice that had been 
offended. [---] Furthermore, some of the students were not led, like today, by a German 
kid, but a Frenchman from Val de Loire.”160 Others saw this, rightly, as yet another 
expression of French anti-semitism. As Laurent Greilsamer wrote in 2008: “Would he 
still dare, saint Mauriac? Would he still dare to make this opposition between the Eternal 
France and the Foreign agent, thrown out like that?”161 It seems that drawing that parallel 
was already an incindary activity, but also a provocative and compelling one, given how 
firmly the Dreyfus affair had been entrenched in French memory. 
Be that as it may, the Dreyfus affair does not come close to the level of 
provocation, incitement and explosiveness of the Vichy analogy. In the years following 
the Dreyfus affair, the tension between liberal intellectuals and ardent anti-semites only 
grew. Tensions between supporters of the ancien régime and increasingly well-off Jews 
heightened during the 1930s to an extent historians have called ‘endemic’.162 These 
tensions came to a head during the four-year rule of Marshal Pétain. This period, now 
known as the time of the Vichy regime, has a special place in French collective memory. 
It is at the same time a symbol of an attempt to recover (or redefine) “Frenchness”, 
“French national character” and the French state, but also a reminder of the perversion of 
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that idea, a veil behind which lay concentration camps, repression and a police state.163 
Vichy was also the moment of reversal for the Jewish community, the end of progressive 
liberalization of the Third Republic and the end of a France that could function as a safe 
haven for German Jews fleeing from the Nazis, the expression of anti-semitic trends that 
had been boiling underneath a calm surface for decades.164 The memory of Vichy was 
both a relieving and a cautious one: It provided both an example that the following 
regimes could decidedly break with, but also a stark reminder that even the darkest road 
to hell is paved with good intentions. 
 The Vichy connection was partially of Cohn-Bendit’s own creation. The sentence 
that propelled him to fame – “Now there’s an answer worthy of Hitler’s youth 
minister”165 – colored his entire career as a leader of the student revolt May. By far the 
most famous image of Cohn-Bendit from ’68 depicts him laughing in the face of an 
oncoming police officer, which, juxtaposed with another famous May slogan, 
“CRS=SS”166, leaves little to the imagination. Not only was Cohn-Bendit rejected by the 
state, but he was also abandoned by his left-wing comrades, falling under strong criticism 
by the French Communist Party and their courier L’Humanité. His ten-year forced exile 
was the last straw. In ’68 it birthed the popular chant “We are all German Jews”. During 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 For a discussion of the role of the Vichy regime in French memory, see Philippe 
Burrin,  “Vichy” in Lieux de Mémoire, 3(1), P. Nora, ed, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 321-345 
164 Pierre Birnbaum, “Grégoire, Dreyfus, Drancy et Copernic” in in Lieux de Mémoire 
3(1), ed. Pierre Nora, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 594 
165 Minute, April 4-10, 1968 
166 CRS are the French Riot Police, formed in 1944 after the liberation. Their biggest 
crime, according to the leftists students was entering the grounds of the Sorbonne, which 
was historically a police-free zone. Though generally thought of a brutal, repressive arm 
of the state by the students, scholars have almost uniformly acknowledged that thanks to 
the foresight of the Prefect of Paris, the CRS were in fact instrumental in keeping the 
May revolt relatively non-violent.  
 68	  
the ten-year commemorations, the episode is almost always associated with Vichy, to the 
point of utter banality: “The deportation of Cohn-Bendit by a small part of the French 
police reminds one of the anti-semitism of the French police in 1942,”167 or “The CRS 
were seen as the Nazis of our time.”168  
The question of anti-semitism and xenophobia, of course, has stayed salient in the 
four decades following ’68, helping to keep the myth of Cohn-Bendit alive in the process. 
Until ’78 the very mention of Cohn-Bendit always brought to mind his continuing exile, 
and consequentely the continuing authoritarianism of the state. No wonder then that at 
least two television debates got effectively derailed by this subject. 169 But even after ’78, 
with the rise of Jean Marie Le Pen’s extreme-right, anti-immigrant Front Nationale, 
Cohn-Bendit remained the symbol of a revolutionary, but persecuted foreigner.170 The 
growing gap between official French policy, which refuses to recognize race as a factor 
in policymaking, social life or any other field of importance, and the reality of 
discrimination and racially divided class structure has become increasingly evident and 
kept alive calls for increased tolerance but also cries to return “France to the French”.171 
Cohn-Bendit has become a symbol for both.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 André Glucksmann in La Crise de 68: Revolte ou Revolution, TF1; see also Edgar 
Morin, “Mai mais. Mais mai. I,” in Le Monde; Ēdouard Waintroup, “L’air du temps. 
Cinéma. Le Rapace Sur Les Temps,” in Libération, May 30, 1998 for examples.  
168 Droit de l’Inventaire, France-3 
169 See: La Crise de 68: Revolte ou Revolution, 05/04/78, Antenne 2 and Aujourd’hui 
Madame: L’heritage de Mai 68, Antenne 2, May 9, 1978 
170 Jim Wolfreys, “Neither Right nor Left? Towards an Integrated Analysis of the Front 
National”, in The Right in France: 1789-1997, N. Atkin & F. Tallett, eds, London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 1998, 261-275 gives an overview of the development and 
political positions of the Front Nationale 
171 Gérard Noiriel, “Francais et Ētrangers,” in Lieux de Mémoire, 3(1), P. Nora, ed, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992, 275-320 examines the mythology of Frenchness, French xenophobia 
and integration of minorities in more detail.  
 69	  
We should not forget, however, that Cohn-Bendit himself has done a lot to keep 
his mythology alive. His actions both during and after ’68 have shaped him into a 
Trickster character, forever subverting expectations, independent and strong-headed even 
after becoming an official representative of the State as a Member of the European 
Parliament.  
This idea, I believe, needs some explanation. Trickster stories are a cross-culture 
feature of human mythology, leading some to believe that they might be innate constructs 
that assist in crafting the “learning process into a communal, joyful, active process”. 172 In 
any case, trickster myths are ubiquitous and provide a vehicle for memory. William 
Hynes and Jeanne Campbell Reesman have identified a number of traits identifying a 
Trickster archetype. Tricksters are “fundamentally ambigous and anomalous”, often 
through comic characterization or ambiguous and overstated sexuality. They are 
deceivers and trick-players. They are shape-shifters and situation-inverters. They are 
“imitators of the gods” and “bricoleurs” – lewd improvisers, who utilize a given situation 
to their advantage.173 These characteristics turn the Trickster into a creative force, one 
who breaks boundaries and disrupts hierarchies in order to reify the old order, or lay the 
groundwork for a new one.174 
It is not difficult to see how Daniel Cohn-Bendit fits into this pattern. He is most 
definitely an ambiguous character: both comic and revolutionary at the same time. He 	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was seen as someone who could grab the people and change their mood at will, but also 
someone whose actual beliefs and ideas were difficult to grasp.175 Commemorative 
articles describe him as “jovial” and “playful”, his jouissant anarchism is contrasted with 
the rigid communism of Georges Seguy.176 His character has obvious links to sexuality – 
he was propelled to fame on a comment regarding the rights of male students to visit 
female dorms, and continued as a spokesman for what is seen as one of the greatest 
sexual revolutions of all time. This trend continued even after 1968, although in  a very 
different context. In a 1975 book Le Grand Bazar Cohn-Bendit wrote a fictionalized 
account of his work as a child counselor in a Frankfurt kindergarten, which included 
descriptions of paedophilia. The issue came up repeatedly during his bids for the 
European Parliament, and he repeatedly denied any real life connections to the event, 
calling it a “verbal provocation”.177  
The image of Cohn-Bendit as the “situation-inverter”, the rebel against the 
established order is one with much appeal to both the soixantehuitards and the gaullists. 
In the archetypal Trickster story, the Trickster’s “mocking of established rules actually 
reaffirms them”.178 Cohn-Bendit too, lost his initial struggle – May failed politically, he 
himself was exiled for a decade and though he himself was popular with the people, his 
Movement of March 22nd never established itself as the ideological leader of the student 	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revolt. For the left, it sowed the seeds of a story of martyrdom, where Cohn-Bendit could 
return to fight another day (yet another feature of the Trickster mythology). This is 
invoked in both describing the Cohn-Bendit of ’68 as well as the Cohn-Bendit of the 
present (whichever decade it then might), a rebel against dogma, whether left-wing or 
right-wing, always out of place, always one step from the edge of the cliff.179  
The image fits equally when it comes to “shape-shifting” and “trick-playing”. On 
the one hand, Cohn-Bendit has been able to appropriate a variety of roles, ultimately 
becoming ironically a part of the establishment he originally wanted to overthrow. From 
a student rebel to a controversial kindergarten instructor, to deputy mayor of Frankfurt to 
a leader of the Green Party, Cohn-Bendit has surprised the audience with every new 
move, remaining, as most commentators attest, “forever a militant rebel”.180 He has 
modified his own personal philosophy several times, shedding the skin of a militant 
anarcho-syndicalist for that of a moderate reformer trying to implement the ideals of ’68 
through the established order of European intergration. The intensely political Cohn-
Bendit of ’68 would never have uttered words of Cohn-Bendit circa 2008: “Socially and 
culturally we won, politically, thank god, we lost”.181 The trick-playing, which can also 
be interpreted as additional examples of him as a “situation-inverter”, involves his 
tendency to undermine conventional social norms, to act and behave in ways completely 
opposite to those expected of someone with his stature. From his comments to Minister 
Missoffe to his interactions with presidential candidate Sarkozy (suggesting that the UMP 	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candidate must have been smoking pot when he came up with his anti-’68 campaign 
slogan), to his frequent self-contradictions in discussions about ’68. A typical 
conversation with Cohn-Bendit usually involved him stating that ’68 was over, done, not 
worth talking about any more and then proceeding to talk about the influence of ’68 on 
contemporary life at some length.182  
We shoud note that Cohn-Bendit’s own interpretation of the mythology of May 
’68 is remarkably consistent with his Trickster role. In reading Margaret Atwood’s 
description of the trickster’s role in mythology, one cannot but be reminded of Cohn-
Bendit and his version of ’68, present already in Nous l’avons tant aimée, la révolution. 
“The trickster [is] responsible for the changes – the mistakes, if you will – that have 
brought about the deplorable muddle and the sometimes joyful muddle of the world as it 
is. [...] He lives by his wits, yet he falls into traps. [...] He’s a god, but a god of dirt and 
mixture and of shameless, unsanctioned sex.”183 Cohn-Bendit consistently characterized 
May as both a success and a failure. Politically, he claimed, the soixantehuitards lacked 
sagesse, could not recognize the power of democracy and ultimately failed because of 
that.184 Socially it changed France forever, everyone, even the right-wing president of 
France owes their values, morality and lifestyle to May.185 He has openly acknowledged 
May’s excesses, including some that he was directly involved in: “CRS=SS was one of 
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the most idiotic things to come out of ’68.”186 Finally, Cohn-Bendit has continued to 
stand behind the image of May as a sexual revolution, an expression of jouissance in 
French society, with himself as the centerpiece of the mythology.187 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s emergence as the central figure of May’s mythology is the 
result of a delicate combination of events and interpretations from the very first days of 
’68 to the conscious shaping of May’s mythology in the following decades. His Jewish 
ancestry combined with a continously antagonistic relationship with authority enabled 
him to tap into some of the central tenets of French collective memory: the persistent 
problem of anti-semitism that shrouds French social discourse is also a constant 
undertone in the Cohn-Bendit mythology. His character and personality have enabled his 
elevation into a mythical trickster figure, a transformation that he himself has actively 
contributed to, with his idiosyncratic interpretation of May that was born out of his 1986 
meditation on May, Nous l’avons tant aimée, la revolution. Finally, he has persisted in 
staying on the front stage of French public discourse for decades, reconstructing a career 
in the European Parliament and the Green Party out of the remains of his revolutionary 
past, providing additional motivation to keep his myth alive. If one is to look at the events 
of May itself, then Cohn-Bendit’s role is well overshadowed by his comrades in the 
UNEF and SNESup, Jacques Sauvageot and Alain Geismar. Yet though they may have 
been the political driving force of the student revolt, Sauvageot and Geismar could never 
build the sort of versatile, adaptive mythology around their personalities, nor could they 
advance an portrayal of May that would compellingly account for their central role in it. 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s success lay in putting mythology before Marx and in the effective 	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transformation of symbolic capital into political and social capital. In his own words: 
“It’s not easy being the symbol of a revolution.”188 
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CHAPTER	  3:	  
MAY	  ’68,	  FORBIDDEN	  FOR	  WOMEN?	  –	  THE	  FEMINIST	  MYTH 
 Mere utterance of the phrase “Representations of May in feminist discourse” 
contains so many problems, raises so many questions, and creates avenues for so many 
contradictions that without a more detailed explanation, we may have well obscured the 
subject of our analysis, instead of clarifying it. What is meant by “feminist discourse”? Is 
it the anglo-american conception of “French feminism”, centered around the Women’s 
Studies trinity of Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray? Is it feminist theory of 
the more militant sort, the sort found in the writings of Christine Delphy, Francoise Picq 
and on the pages of popular radical-left publications, from Libération to Les Temps 
Modernes? Or should we be concerned with feminist activism, in the form of the 
Mouvement de la Libération des Femmes (MLF)? Should we be looking at the radical, 
countercultural feminisms that formed on the margins of French society and slowly made 
their way to the mainstream, or should we be concerned with the mainstream itself, 
discourse that made its way into common parlance, the kitchen table, to use a tired, yet 
apt metaphor? Finally, is it even possible to describe representations of May in feminist 
discourse in a coherent, totalizing way, without doing an huge disservice to the numerous 
forms of feminism that have existed in French society in the past four decades? 
 The answer to the last question can, of course, only be affirmative otherwise this 
chapter would come to an end very quickly. As before, concentrating on the anniversaries 
of May and on popular media, allows us to restrict our analysis to the ‘mainstream’, as 
close as possible to the zeitgeist, the viewpoint of common people, those without a direct 
personal interest in feminism as a movement. Second, though specific assertions about 
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’68 in the feminist context can differ greatly based on writer, movement and publication, 
we can outline a set of general assumptions that are rarely questioned or even stated. 
These presuppositions outline the space of discussion, the framework on which different 
writers with different viewpoints interact with eachother, the set of shared ideas that 
allows them to disagree on other ideas. In other words, we will look at the discussion of 
women’s liberation, feminism and their use of May ’68 as a discursive field.189  
 More interesting than simply defining the changes in this discursive field from 
1978 to 2008, is understanding the conditions that made these changes possible. In 
foucauldian terms, this would mean looking at changes in the social fabric and the 
relations of power in order to see how the space for specific discourses was created.190 
May ’68 has always been seen as a time of immense social change, it has been credited 
with introducing contraceptives to French women, with breaking down authoritarian 
family relations and breaking the image of the “man as something that is superior to a 
woman”.191 However, it was not until the 1980s that these developments became 
associated with women’s liberation, second wave feminism and specific organizations, 
such as the MLF. This is quite surprising, given that these movemnents had existed since 
the early 1970s. Until the 1980s, however, the social changes that May 1968 directly or 
indirectly brough about were seen as a part of a broader revolutionary trend, as a part of 	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an extragender sexual revolution or as a disturbing trend towards increasing moral 
laxation, but never as changes related specifically to issues of gender or female 
emancipation. As the reforms of the Giscard administration became entrenched in society 
and the decisively equality-oriented politicies of the Mitterrand government further 
cemented progressive gender roles in public consciousness, feminist thought became the 
subject of acceptable discourse. May 1968 became known as the breaking point of the old 
authoritarian society, the genesis of feminist movements in both theory and action. Yet 
this interpretation was not permanent. The nineties brought about a resurgence of 
feminist activism, ’68 was left further and further into the past and gender relations 
became increasingly more liberal. In this changed atmosphere, May was no longer 
conceived of as the epitome of liberation and radicalism. Instead 1968 became an object 
of criticism for its chauvinism, phallocentrism and lack of real respect towards female 
equality. This trend has carried over to the new millennium, only exarcebated by the 
phasing out of radical Marxist feminism in favor of centrist equality movements and 
“litcrit” feminism. It is therefore important to consider not only the changing role of 
gender norms in French society, but also the changing nature of feminist theory and the 
fading authority of left-wing radicals complemented by the failure of the Mitterand 
administration to enact real socialist reforms and the fall of Communism in 1989 and 
1991.  
 The rupture in sexual and gender norms in France goes back far beyond the 
revolutionary spring of 1968. Protests against dormitory rights and sexual repression on 
university campuses, which are often used as metonyms for May, were taking place 
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several years before the student riots.192 Two revolutionary reforms, allowing women to 
work without their husband’s permission and legalizing contraceptives were passed in 
1965 and 1967, respectively.193 The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir’s classic work of 
contemporary feminism predated those developments by more than 20 years. Though the 
goal of this chapter is not ‘set the record straight’, to compare fictitious origins of 
emancipation struggles against real ones, it should still be noted that placing the origin of 
the Women’s Movement in 1968 is very much an arbitrary decision, a question of motive 
and of memory, rather than of historical fact.  
 ’68 itself, in fact, achieved little in terms of sexual or gender liberation. Its effects 
on French mentalities are debatable, some have called its influence profound and far-
reaching, others “mostly mythical”, more symbol than substance.194 In real terms, May 
won the workers an increase in the SMIC (Minimum wage for industrial workers), a 
reorganization of the university system, but no direct and immediate legal reforms in the 
fields of gender equality and sexual liberalization.  
 Canonically, the second wave of French Feminism is tied to the formation of the 
MLF, an association of feminist organizations, named by the pejoratively-minded press. 
The first mention of the MLF is found in reports of a demonstration at the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier on August 28, 1970. A group of loosely affiliated radical feminist 
organizations, some indeed with roots in ’68, symbolically protested in front of the 	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Unknown Soldier in order to “draw attention to someone even more unknown than the 
Soldier – his wife”.195 Other demonstrations soon followed and though participating 
organizations varied from occasion to occasion, the press convenientely labeled all of 
them under the heading ‘MLF’.196  In 1974, Hélene Cixous founded the first Women’s 
Studies Department at the University of Paris VII. Her seminal works on “feminine 
writing” soon followed.197 As feminist activism proliferated both in literary magazines as 
well as on the streets, the Giscard administration followed suit with a number of reforms, 
starting with creation of a State Secretary for the Condition of Women, to mixed 
criticism. Many saw the Secretary as simply a ceremonial position, created for appeasing 
the unexpectedly vocal feminist militants. But real reforms soon followed: the Giscard 
administration decriminalized adultery, legalized divorce based on mutual consent and 
ultimately gave women abortion rights in 1974.198 Gender equality slowly became a topic 
of mainstream discussion. The victory of the PS in 1981 and the creation of a Ministry of 
Women’s Rights along with the dissolution of the MLF (partially due to a coup d’état by 
a Lacanian post-structuralist feminist movement called Psych et Po) reinforced the 
feeling that the radical roots of feminism had been dissolved and gender equality had 
become a government policy like any other.199 
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 The 1980s saw both the proliferation of feminism as well as a wave of reactionary 
movements, not limited simply to Le Pen’s Front National. At the same time, record 
numbers of French (well over 70% according to some polls) supported feminist causes.200 
Yet having become a topic of legitimate political debate, issues like contraceptives and 
abortion resurfaced, this time carried by political parties instead of activist groups and 
supported or opposed by feminists of different sorts on both ends of the political divide. 
Sexual harassment and sexism in general became topics of public interest, with the PS 
aggressively, yet unsuccessfully trying to hold high the liberal banner – ultimately the 
Mitterrand administration passed few real reforms in those areas.201 Though the 1980s 
saw terms like ‘gender equality’, ‘sexism’ and ‘female emancipation’ enter the 
mainstream vocabulary, it also caused a growing rift between different movements, some 
of which saw the Socialist government as a profound disappointment instead of the 
radical change they had hoped for.  
 This disillusionment, along with the return of the Right in 1993, contributed to the 
resurgence of militant feminism in the 1990s. The enactment of a new labor law that 
facilitated layoffs and the creation of part-time and short-term positions was vehemently 
opposed by female labor unions, who organized walk-outs and strikes in 1993 and 
1994.202 Electoral victories of the Front Nationale contributed to a resurgence of radical 
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feminism, this time supported by the mainstream media203. Groups like CADAC and 
MFPF, though founded in the late 80s, gained tremendous popularity.204 Probably the 
most influential group, the Parity Movement called for a constitutional amendment 
requiring women to be represented in legislative assemblies on a parity with men. The 
idea gained immense traction in just a few years, and the socialist government of Lionel 
Jospin, with the approval of conservative president Jacques Chirac, enacted the proposal 
into law in 2000. According to the law, political parties had endorse an equal number of 
male and female candidates in all elections.205  
 Many of the trends characterizing the 1990s carried over to the next millennium. 
The discussion over equal rights became literally quotidian in French mainstream press, 
and the legislative apparatus turned towards issues like civil union (enacted in 2000) and 
other gay rights, as well as equal status in the workplace and family policy.206 The 
question of the islamic head-scarf, the so-called affaire des foulards, which had been 
brewing since the late 1980s was among the foremost issues of the 2000s.207 With the 
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importance of gender equality firmly fixed in the public consciousness, debate shifted 
over to specific aspects of equality associated with particular marginalized groups.  
 In some respects, the link between the May riots and various feminist movements 
is not at all surprising. Serious material and intellectual connections existed between the 
two movements. Some feminist organizations, such as Féminin. Masculin. Avenir were 
indeed born in May 1968 and became eventually consolidated under the umbrella of the 
MLF.208 Theoretically too, early second wave Feminism was influenced directly by the 
new radical forms of Marxism and critical theory that shaped the course of May ’68. New 
feminist thought, similarly to the ideas driving the May revolts, was oriented both against 
the conservative Gaullists, but also against traditional left-wing Marxists. In addition, 
both intellectual currents were strongly influenced by situationist radicals, anti-stalinist 
trotskyists and anarchists.209 However, far from being the only influence on the MLF 
philosophy, the jouissance of ’68 was complemented by the existentialism of Simone de 
Beauvoir, the social activism of American feminism, to name just a few examples.210 
 While these influences were recognized and affirmed by feminist writers working 
in the confines of their specific organizations and journals ten years after the May revolts, 
the attitudes conveyed in major newspapers and television broadcasts were profoundly 
different. Out of four major French newspapers, only Le Monde published an article on 
the relationship of May and Feminism, entitled tellingly “Soft Feminism”. The article 
related the ’68 critique of the consumer society to the struggle for gender equality, and 
emphasized the role of cooperation, rather than conflict in resolving the power struggle 	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between sexes. “The woman should cling to the earth and bring Man back to it. Not by 
taking the power from him, but by a mutual agreeement, a pact.”211 Significantly, this 
article focuses on deradicalizing the social critique of ’68, leaving aside many tropes that 
would later become central to feminist interpretations of May: the changing of social 
norms, sexual liberation, and the association with the MLF. If we are to assume that the 
foundations of the discourse of May as the birthplace of second-wave feminism were 
present already in 1978, then this article certainly failed to reflect that.  
 Yet the social changes that were later cited as the lasting effects of May in 
feminist narratives of 1968 were well known to commentators in 1978. A “balance sheet” 
of May summed up the social effects of May as follows:  
There are no more marginals ... if one was to make a list of everyone who 
“spoke” in the last ten years ... the list of broken taboos would never end 
...: sexuality, abortion, homosexuality, rape, madness, prostitution, 
divorce, drugs, long hair, communities, birth, death..212 
 
 This article alone listed most of the key issues that only ten years later would 
become associated with feminism. Other similar balance sheets mentioned abortion rights 
and sexual liberation alongside “battles for ecologie, autogestion, Océania, against 
nuclear power and ten or twelve other passionate and diffuse causes.”213 TV broadcasts 
on the government-affiliated Antenne 2 put a conservative spin on the same issue, with 
guests lamenting the newfound “decadence”, an excess of “permissivness”, most 
frequently in sexual affairs and the lack of respect towards the older generation.214 Some 
saw the social effects of ’68 as incomplete, an attempt at reform that had lamentably 	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stopped and called president Giscard d’Estaing “as authoritarian, though more intelligent 
than Monsieur Chirac”.215 
 Evidently social liberalization was perceived as an important legacy of May, 
however neither the mainstream media nor the few feminists participating in mainstream 
discourse never associated these ‘elements of social liberalization’ specifically with 
women, nor were they identified clearly as pertaining to gender equality. The word 
“feminism” never came up. Rather, post-1968 social changes were identified as issues of 
broad public concern, categorized as “progressivism” or “decadence” depending on the 
viewer’s political orientation, and seen generally as issues affecting the society as a 
whole, not as key concerns of specific interest groups, such as the feminists. 
This is not to suggest that feminists were not concerned with the social 
implications of May. Issues like abortion rights, contraceptives and divorce are topics that 
affect women first and foremost.  The MLF had championed these issues since their first 
demonstration by the Unknown Soldier in 1970, and their centrality in feminist literature 
goes back even further. It is not that feminist movements were not interested in the social 
aspects of May, Les Histoires de MLF and Histoire Des Feminismes Francais, both 
published in 1978, show the opposite. However, in 1978, feminism was still a 
marginalized movement. It was symbolically marginal, in the sense that French elites and 
to some extent, the public, saw it as having little broad significance, as a secondary issue, 
subordinate to more pressing political and social concerns. It was also factually marginal, 
in the sense that it was a movement still vying for political power, pressuring the 
legislators and public opinion from the outside, with few advocates amongst the 	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established French elites. No wonder, given that those elites, in both media and 
government, were predominantly old, male and if not Gaullist, then at least moderate or 
conservative.216 This male-dominated hierarchy was further compounded by the belief in 
French Universalism, the idea that all people are created equal and thus no attention 
should be payed to class, race, gender or other distinguishing characteristics in any sort of 
public discourse.217 Though purely in terms of political reform, the feminist movement 
had achieved a lot, the perception of May as a example of universal social liberation, 
rather than specifically feminist in certain aspects, showed that the conditions for a broad 
discussion of feminism as an integral part of French society were not yet ripe.  
 Yet by 1988, feminism and May had become inseparable. Bruno Frappat called 
feminism “the incontestable progeny of May”.218 In another article, feminism was cited 
as one of the indicators showing that “although May is far, its shadow is still with us”.219 
Even in political articles, focusing exclusively on the workers, the PCF and the PS, 
feminism was brought up as one of “specific aspirations converging on a communal 
perspective” that ultimately allowed for the emergence of the general strike.220 Finally, 
the connection with the MLF was often invoked: “The encounter of trotskyist students 
and maoistes in Mantes [...] paved the way for the demonstrations of the MLF, most 
notably for abortion rights and contraceptives.”221 Not only had a completely new mode 
of evaluating May penetrated the public media in the ten years between 1978 and 1988, it 	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had become so entrenched in public discourse that no-one felt the need to actually 
explain why the relationship between May and feminism was so strong, it was literally 
considered ‘incontestable’. 
 Though May was now seen in terms of feminism, in addition to politics and 
general social change, the issues that became associated with gender equality were 
neither new nor surprising. Stéphane Paoli listed the following key issues in the feminist 
interpretation of May: abortion, birth control, patriarchy in marriage and divorce.222 Alain 
Krivine, a member of the LCF, put the feminist movement in the same category with the 
workers’ autogestion movement and the immigrant rights movement as battles that were 
started in 1968.223 Perhaps the most comprehensive account of the feminist interpretation 
of May was given in the program Procés de Mai. An ten-minute introductory clip 
acquainted the viewer to the situation of women’s rights in the 1960s, a time when 
women could not get a job without their husbands’ permission, contraception was illegal, 
abortion equally so, schoolgirls had to wear uniforms and the definition of man was 
“someone who is superior to a woman”.224 Though only 20 years had passed since the 
students’ and workers’ riots, 1968 was painted as the breaking point between an almost 
prehistoric time and the modern world. Documentary footage from 1968 was interspersed 
with contemporary commentary by activists, health care professionals, policymakers and 
other, who almost universally described their astonishment with the backward gender 
policies of pre-1968 times. 1968 did not mark a milestone for feminism simply because 
of this perception of a milestone transition, but because it was described literally as the 	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birthplace of feminism, or in other words, the MLF. The 1970 Unknown Soldier 
demonstration was never mentioned, and the jump from May demonstrations to footage 
of the MLF was presented in such quick succession that a less perceptive viewer could 
have conflated the two events. The debate following the film provided a conservative and 
a progressive reading of the feminist interpretation of May. Annette Levy-Willard 
considered the MLF amongst the excesses of May, another example of May going too 
far, causing as much social disorder as caused social change. “Some of [the militant 
feminists] are now divorced, some are living in communities of women. This simply not 
true, women cannot exist without men”.225 In response, a member of the “jury”, a 
university student from 1988 noted that while the MLF was successful in certain regards, 
“a lot still remains to be done; we continue living in a man’s world”.226 Though the 
evaluations of the feminist May differed, both parties operated at the assumption that 
gender equality and women’s rights constituted in some ways the essence of ’68 and that 
the MLF, gender reforms in universities, abortion rights, divorce rights and other 
giscardian reforms could be traced back to May.  
 What had changed between 1978 and 88 that brought May and feminism together 
and placed them on the center stage of public discourse? How did this connection, which 
in 1978 was anything but “incontestable” and “obvious” suddenly become ingrained and 
propagated so thoroughly that it featured prominently in almost every major discussion of 
’68 two decades later? The impulse to conflate the birth of the MLF and the May riots is 
understandable, as the May riots provide an adequate context for an event of such 
groundbreaking magnitude. If we look at the creation of the MLF as an archetypal event, 	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a “creation myth”, then it needs a context more powerful than a diffuse set of 
demonstrations in the 1970 or the continuous build-up of social conflict during the 1960s. 
Since 1970 and 1968 are in close proximity – looking back from 1988, anyway – the 
conflation becomes even easier. The link with May also helped to add legitimacy to the 
women’s movement, by way of association with other causes that May had become to 
symbolize. In some ways, the case of a Feminist May is an inversion of the Daniel Cohn-
Bendit myth: the association stuck, because it could easily be associated with May 1968, 
an event that by 1988 had become an important part of French collective memory. 
Finally, if certain concerns, such as contraception and abortion rights were considered 
inherently “feminist” topics in 1988, it was intuitive to ascribe intentionality to students 
fighting for similar causes in 1968 as well, without regard to whether they actually had 
such intentions or not. This process parallels a similar situation analyzed in Alessandro 
Portelli’s seminal work on oral history, The Death of Luigi Trastulli. Portelli describes 
how the death of a young steel worker in the hands of the police in 1949 was ingrained in 
popular memory as having happened in 1953, a time mass strikes and high 
unemployment. In these conditions the tragic death seemed more meaningful than in an 
accidental and inconsequential police riot. In our case, the association with May 1968, an 
event with larger social impact and great mythological status, made the birth of the MLF 
more meaningful in a similar way.227  
 The forces that kept the feminist May out of the public eye in 1978 and allowed it 
to emerge by 1988 have less to do with the public’s perception of May, and more with 
their perception of feminism. The feminism of 1978 was a strongly partisan topic, 	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advanced by activist organizations and a small number of theorists. Though public 
demonstrations and protests combined with general social liberalization finally pressured 
the Giscard administration to push through reforms benefiting the feminist cause, 
women’s rights and gender equality were not mainstream media issues or governmental 
policy agendas. This changed with the election of Mitterand in 1981, who won widely 
thanks to the support of women voters, and started his term by appointing a Minister of 
Women’s Rights.228 While the role of official state institutions in bringing social issues to 
the public’s light should not be overestimated, it is also clear that it is in the nature of 
mass media to be concerned first and foremost with government policy. Thus, simply by 
having an item added to the government’s agenda can be sufficient to propel it to the 
center of public attention through media coverage. Social liberalization, combined with 
the explicilty pro-feminist attitude of the Mitterand administration was enough to start a 
debate over the merits and dangers of feminism that was not simply limited to 
demonstrations and articles in specialized journals and publications, but could take place 
in the mass media, under the watchful eye of journalists and editors, who were, of course, 
predominanty male. The 1980s also brought about a deradicalization of feminism, with 
the dissolution of the MLF, allowing more conservative commentators to participate in 
the conversation. The quickly waning activism of the Mitterrand administration brought 
about two different interpretations of feminism, one claiming that feminism had gone too 
far, that its “legitimate” goals had already been achieved and that all new claims for 
equality and liberalization were excesses; the other lamenting the deradicalization of the 
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movement and calling out for a feminist revival.229 These two interpretations aligned well 
with the major political interpretations of May that we discussed in the first chapter – 
conservatives who thought that any further feminist claims would be excesses also 
considered May an excess, and progressives who lamented the deradicalization of 
feminism under the Mitterand administration also thought the socialists had betrayed the 
ideals of May. Uniting these two strands under the same umbrella was a powerful tool for 
gaining support for both die-hard soixante-huitards, progressive feminists and the 
conservative opposition.  
 Ten years later, the feminist May was as alive as it had been during the twentieth 
anniversary of the riots. TV news reports looking back at the events of May usually 
dedicated one clip to the Grenelle Accords and the general strikes, one to the student 
revolts and one to the feminist May.230 The arch-myth of the feminist May was 
effectively the same as it was in 1988 – May was the breaking point, after which the 
authoritarian, parternalistic society of Gaullist France started giving way to a more 
liberal, equal society, giving birth to the MLF in the process. But as always, where there 
is continuity, there is also change. While the 1988 version of feminist May focused 
primarily on the social aspects of May as representing the concerns of women, the story 
was now expanded to cover the entire political sphere. In the words of Genevieve Fraisse, 
in a discussion over the legacy of ’68 in feminism: “The women’s movement was not 
born simply to promote sexual liberation. It is a political movement. Most notably, we 
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critique voting rights, we critique the institutions.”231 With this assertion, the connection 
between May and feminism had become even stronger, since the link no longer involved 
simply the shared social agendas of the soixantehuitards and the feminists, but the 
interests of the Left and the feminists in general. Of course, this too was nothing new, and 
had been articulated by French feminist theorists, particularly Christine Delphy for 
decades. However, it was not until the the 1990s that this connection became an issue of 
importance in the eyes of the wide reading public, thanks to the proliferation of the parity 
movement, demanding equal representation of women in French legislative bodies. The 
movement was brought to the public attention both by grass-roots movements who 
bought page-long ads in Le Monde and vocalized themselves through mass 
demonstrations and protests, the intellectual elite, represented by the likes of Christine 
Delphy and Héléne Cixous who had by 1998 established themselves as public 
intellectuals par excellence and political parties, the socialists and communists who have 
traditionally had large constituencies and their main competitor, the UDF, which had to 
attract new voters in order maintain (and later restore) their dominance in the legislative 
assemblies. In fact, during the 1995 presidential elections, all political parties except 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front Nationale named parity an important goal to be achieved with 
either legislation or other, non-coercive measures.232 This tangible, practical change in 
social practices helped to bring what had thus far been mostly a theoretical concern into 
the public light.  
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 Another change that helped broaden the focus of the feminist narrative of May 
was the increase of women writers, women journalists, women sociologists and 
intellectuals and women politicians in the public sphere. Though still vastly outnumbered 
by their male colleagues, the presence of women in mass media had increased 
significantly by 1998. In 1997, 38 percent of accredited journalists in France were 
women, more than twice the number in 1979.233 Furthermore, the attitude of the media as 
a whole had changed from the early 1980s attitude of “Sois belle, et tais toi!” (Be pretty 
and be quiet) to one that highlighted women in both the profession itself as well as in its 
coverage of women celebrities.234 The percentages are much lower in the political sphere, 
for instance only 10 percent of legislators in the Assemblée Nationale and the Senate 
were female in 1997, yet even number had seen a more than a 50% increase after the 
1995 elections.235  
 The representation of May reflects this trend. On the one hand, there is a far larger 
presence of female commentators, but also the major newspapers in 1998 focused on 
recreating the experience of May through oral histories, rather than commenting on its 
legacy. Le Monde republished a series of articles originally written during the days of the 
riots, La Libération offered a more traditional retrospective and L’Humanité, ironically 
along with the conservative Le Figaro were the two newspapers to offer more traditional 
perspective, though both incorporated extensive interviews with former soixante-huitards 
who offered their reflections from the distance of thirty years. The emergence of female 	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voices and an emphasis on unmediated impressions from 1968 allowed for a more 
nuanced picture to emerge, one that preserved the core of the feminist May, but 
complicated some of the assertions that had been ingrained in the French collective 
memory since the eighties. Anne Wiazemsky, the lead actress in Jean-Luc Godard’s 
Chinoise, which has often been seen as the fictional precursor of ’68 recalled in an 
interview for L’Humanité how the social upheaval that had become the symbol of May 
spanned more than three years in her life. “In 1967, 1968 and 1969 there was not a single 
moment in which I was bored.”236 A companion article in the same issue highlighted 
some of the issues involved in descriptions of May as some sort of feminist watershed. 
While Annie Manrique noted that doctors were uncomfortable prescribing contraceptives 
as late as 1970 and Emmannuelle Prost noted that the proliferation of contraceptives was 
soon complicated by the AIDS epidemic, all three interviewed women remained true to 
the narrative of May ’68 as a breaking point.237  In contrast, a memoir in La Libération 
questions the feminist nature of May’s sexual liberties in a way that would not have been 
possible only ten years ago: “A guy, one of the future leaders of ’68 asks me one day: 
‘Are you for sexual liberation?’ – I say that I am. – ‘All right, we’ll sleep together then.’ 
The guys used this sexual liberation to pressure women into sleeping with them.”238 
The female perspective also helps to cement the feminist cause as an enduring 
legacy of May, in contrast to other legacies, which have in time come to be seen as 
utopia. This theme was central to two retrospectives of May, Autocritique 68/98 and Mai 	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68 a 30 ans. Et Alors? Both programmes asserted that while the legacy of May had died 
out or outright failed in certain aspects (neoliberalism had triumphed, the education 
system was in a worse shape than ever before), the ’68 for feminism never ended. “The 
complete liberation of women, which the MLF continued after ’68 remains in this sense 
topical.”239 Though the focus on ’68 itself, rather than a contemporary commentary 
helped to strike the first cracks in the feminist May narrative, the myth was in fact 
stronger than ever. The failure of the Left in France and the collapse of communism in 
the Soviet Union had discredited many traditional interpretations of May, leaving 
feminism as its one enduring legacy, the one battle with tangible, radical results and 
topical, well-defined goals.  
 The new century brought about the next great shift in the narrative. It is hard to 
imagine a discussion of May titled “May ’68 – Forbidden for Women?” ten or twenty 
years earlier, yet such titles were commonplace in the TV and news media of 2008. A 
two-hour retrospective on May criticized the ’68 movement for being chauvinist and 
leaving the women of ’68 in the role of the French Marianne – a flagcarrier, but no more 
than that. “The role of women in ’68 is that of the middle-ages” said one commentator.240 
“Only in the smallest of groups were women equal to men, the true leaders of ’68, 
however, were all men”, said another.241 The criticism of ’68 as a period of sexual 
liberation continued with various articles pointing out that the fight against misogyny and 
chauvinism was as difficult and painful for both the militants and their families after ’68 
as it had been before it. “[The MLF] years were the worst years of her childhood. Even if 	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she can appreciate it with validity today, the feminist universe of her mother scared 
her.”242 Various articles noted how ’68 was only a stand-in for a far longer period of 
social liberalization that could be dated as far back as the 50s and carried on to the late 
70s. The rupture was wider and deeper than anyone had imagined.243 If this was 
mythbusting, then it was not very successful, since the myth remained alive, although in a 
more contested form. In a 2007 poll, gender equality was by far the first advancement the 
French associated with May 1968, followed by ‘social protection’ and ‘workers’ 
rights’.244  
 By 2008, May ’68 had grown old and feminism had moved on, the marriage was 
no longer as vibrant as it used to be, but it persisted, mostly out of habit. Memories once 
formed are hard to break, and the feminist interpretation of May had been around for 
several decades. May, on the other hand had become history, even though it had been 
revived by the Sarkozy campaign, it no longer had the same mythical proportions that it 
had when the soixante-huitards were still in the most active part of French society. The 
generation had changed and the memories of May were no longer as immediate. But 
feminism too had moved on. By 2008, parity laws had been passed, contraceptives, 
abortion and divorce were quotidian and the feminist struggle carried on in the new 
margins: the burqa laws, immigrant rights, gay and lesbian rights etc. The fight for 
equality was no longer simply a topic of popular debate, it was a widely supported 
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popular debate that makes headlines on a daily basis.245 This is not to suggest that by 
2008, equality had been achieved on some mythical “general” level, but that the status 
quo of French everyday life was radically different even from the liberal days of May. In 
short, the standards against which ’68 was being judged had become far more stringent. 
From a 2008 perspective, the attitudes of the students and workers of 1968 could appear 
conservative indeed.  
  The development of the feminist narrative of May demonstrates the plethora of 
factors that shape public memory. We can look for sources of power, elites who shape the 
information that gets presented to the public and creates the basis of popular discourse 
and popular memory. These sources of power are not simply limited to the government 
and the media elites, but on a nation-wide level, the memory of the ‘imagined 
community’ has to be at some point be mediated by journalism. But in a democratic 
society, grass-roots interest groups and social bodies too can exert power. In the case of 
the feminist interpretation of May it took a combination of elite recognition and popular 
support for the riots to become associated with feminism. Once the groundwork was set 
though, the feminist narrative became such a powerful myth that it shaped the discourse 
around May for decades, reaching only in 2008 the point, where it became possible to 
unpack the myth again, to reintroduce nuance into a powerful origin story that has been 
cemented by decades of repetition. The feminist narrative of May lucidly demonstrates 
how memory is always seen through a contemporary perspective, how events of the past 
are interpreted in light of concerns of the present.  
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The feminist narrative of May also shows how the idiosyncratic nature of memory 
draws on analogy and metonymy, in other words the creativity of the human mind, in 
order to construct a narrative with staying power. Alessandro Portelli has observed that 
memory often manipulates history for symbolic, psychological and formal reasons.246 
Symbolically, the MLF represented a radical force of social change, a militant 
progressive movement that would have felt at home in the midst of the May riots. 
Memory thus relocated the birth of the movement to its appropriate context, even if 
historically speaking, the origin is firmly fixed in 1970. Psychologically, the successes of 
feminism imposed over May provided a method of healing. In the first decades, the link 
with May was a means of associating with something bigger, an event that had resonance 
in the French society as a whole; in the later decades feminism became the one success 
that the memory of May could hold on to – when everything else was being dismissed as 
utopia, the women’s movement could show unqualified successes and realistically 
achievable goals for the future. Formally, May was a rupture point, a break with time, the 
moment that divide time into a before and an after, so any social change that originated 
near 1968 would become conflated with it.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
GENERATION ’68 – MAY BETWEEN HISTORY AND 
MEMORY 
 
 “The Crisis of ’68 – Revolt or Revolution?”, “A bit of joyous revolution, a bit of 
revolutionary joy”, “May ’68 or a Civilized Revolution”, “The gains and limits of a 
verbal ‘revolution’”, “The popular fight continues”,  “We knew how to kick Marx into 
the long grass”, “[’68 contained] the roots of terrorism” – from editorial pages of the 
ultra-left L’Humanité to the conservative newsrooms and studios of Le Figaro and TF1, 
ten years down the line, ‘revolution’ was the operative word in discussions of May 
1968.247 A decade later, the word was nowhere to be found. Instead, televised debates 
talked about the excesses of May, and newspaper editorials mentioned the word 
‘illusion.248 By the fortieth anniversary those emotions too had died down to vague 
notions of utopia, and a sentiment among the young French that May “was vague, but it 
was good”.249 From an acute sense of urgency, commemorations of May had turned into 
what Jean-Pierre Rioux called a routine reenactment of established narratives, “still not 
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really aware of what it is we’re celebrating.”250 A similar narrative was advanced by 
Kristin Ross, who suggested that the second decennial of May brought with it a “false 
consensus”, reducing May to a harmless youth revolt and a precursor to the market 
democracy and forceful individualism of 1980s neoliberalism.251 
 One should be careful with assigning totalizing narratives on complex processes 
of memorialization. As we have seen in previous chapters, discourse around May has 
always been multivocal and in constant flux. In the political sphere the revolutionary 
aspects of May retained their prominence even in the decades following the first 
decennial. The feminist narrative of May, entirely political in nature, did not emerge until 
1988, the supposed date of “revolutionary quietism”. To see the decline of the 
‘revolutionary narrative’ of ’68 as a sign of the imposition of an “official history” is 
perhaps a step too far. Nevertheless, the is an audible change in tone in May’s narratives 
the further one gets from 1968. This aim of this chapter is to trace that change in tone and 
relate it to a generational change, the gradual exit of revolutionary activists and genuine 
soixante-huitards, and the emergence of dispassionate scholars and a new generation of 
students and workers with a less immediate connection to May 1968.252 From an intense 
personal memory that permeated the minds of the French public in 1978, to a gradual 
neutralization of its impact and the emergence of scholarly counter-narratives amidst an 
explosion of commemorations, this chapter tells the story of May reaching the precarious 
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space between history and memory which Pierre Nora has famously called a lieux de 
mémoire..  
 Instead of focusing on a specific connection or narrative of May, this chapter will 
look at instances where 1968 has been described as “revolutionary”, or the opposite, 
“illusionary” or “utopian”. In what contexts are these assertions made? What does that 
tell us about the concerns and motives of the people making those claims? What are the 
social and political processes that frame these assertions? Since we have already 
examined the mythologization of May in the political sphere, this chapter will focus 
largely on the social aspects of May narratives and make reference to contemporary 
political discussions only on occasion.  
 By 1978 the shock of the May revolts was still rippling through society. When 
May was called ‘revolutionary’, it was done most often in two related contexts: As a 
reference to the sudden rupture in the fabric of normality that May appeared to be; and as 
a signifier of a broad transformation of French society originating in May. The rupture 
could mean both a positive break with the opressive reality of the day (from a soixante-
huitard’s perspective), or an unwelcome interruption of the status quo (from a 
conservative perspective). In both cases, the irrefutable break with the normal state of 
affairs was recognized as a “revolutionary” element of May. This dynamic was vividly 
represented in a 1978 televised debate, titled “The Crisis of ’68 – Revolt or 
Revolution?”253 Of course, the title itself already revealed a certain consensus, whichever 
side one took: both terms presuppose a legitimately violent affair, an sudden upset of the 
normal order of things, far from the “vague but good” utopia of a joyous student uprising 	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that came to dominate much of later discourse on May. Indeed, so such claims were made 
in the actual debate. Michel Droit, arguing that May was ultimately a revolt, not a 
revolution, still pointed out the “incredible violence” of student leaders like Daniel Cohn-
Bendit or Alain Krivine, while André Glucksmann, rejecting the proposition, still 
maintained that “just because there was no military, no violence, does not mean there was 
no revolution. Instead this may have been the turning point.”254 Whether the term used 
was “revolt”or “revolution”, the consensus was, in the words of the host, that “[May was] 
a crisis no-one has forgotten.”255 
 The same debate could also be seen as an example of our second case: 
‘revolution’ as a signifier of broad social change. The opening narration noted that 
“[May] changed the society in which we live”, though interestingly enough refused to 
elaborate on what exactly that social change meant. A similarly vague notion of 
“something changing” could be gleamed from brief news reports on TF1, which 
described 1968 as having become “a synonym for uprising, revolt or even revolution”.256 
Similarly, the report did not mention specific changes in French society, aside from two 
tropes that were already present in the “Revolt or Revolution” debate: No-one saw it 
coming, and “people started to speak”.257  
 The latter idea is elaborated at length in two articles in commemorative editions 
of L’Humanité and Le Figaro. In the first case, communist activist Guy Hernier described 
May as a “revelation”, the point after which discussions about global capital, 
contradictions of the capitalist system and anti-capitalism became commonplace and 	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widespread.258 Even if the gauchistes of ’68 failed in their direct revolutionary goals – 
after all, the capitalist system remained as strong as ever – they managed to bring the 
latent contradictions of the system into public light. A more centrist perspective was 
articulated by Annie Kriegel on the pages of Le Figaro: “Winners or losers, the important 
thing was for [the soixante-huitards] to discover in themselves the capacity to talk, not in 
their name, but from a collective experience”.259 The revolutionary impact of May was 
primarily seen in it capacity to incite discourse, an idea echoed much later in many 
scholarly treatments of ’68, including Michael Seidman’s The Imaginary Revolution. 
 It also helped that the soixante-huitards were not shy about using direct allusions 
to their revolutionary background, including references to French and Russian 
Revolutions, both during May itself and in later discussions. Student activists appearing 
in media preferred to talk about the development of their gauchiste views than the free-
play and jouissance that supposedly accompanied the month-long occupation of the 
Sorbonne.260 Meanwhile, commentators could not overlook the ’68 barricades and 
cobblestone fights – direct references to the French Revolution of 1789.261 
 Though most commentators participated in reproducing the May-as-revolution 
narrative, a few opted for a more pessimistic view. Two authors proposed a view of May-
as-illusion, a trope that came into full bloom a decade later. Jean-Edern Hallier, a former 
soixante-huitard, denounced May completely: “May ’68, that means nothing. No death, 	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or almost none. No imagination in power. Only the lingering smell of surrealism. [---] It 
had nothing to do with neither 1848 or the Commune. No intellectual thrill.”262 Signs of 
this sentiment were present even outside the confines of the conservative Le Figaro, a 
commentator in Le Monde called May a “tragical comedy”, a revolution in which “no-
one was prepared to die for”, a “small party in the style of Roger Vailland”263 lacking 
“the raw energy capable of dreaming whatever.”264  
 The main difference between the commentators who rejected the revolutionary 
interpretation of May and those who embraced it lay in the emphasis placed in the real, 
material outcomes of May. Those who portrayed 1968 as a revolution or at least a 
rupture, emphasized the sudden break with the normal day-to-day existence of French 
society, or the ripple effect produced by the sudden liberation of discourse. Those who 
rejected May-as-revolution provided comparisons with a revolutionary ideal-type. In their 
view, revolutions involved deaths, a substantial change in the political system, or at least 
a prolonged period of political upheaval towards a specific end. In their view, May had 
none of the elements. 
 Nevertheless, the revolutionary aspect of 1968 dominated May’s first decennial, 
possibly owing to the strong presence of the “1968 generation” in the public sphere. 
Pierre Nora has suggested that historical generations – demographic cohorts defined by a 
single historical rupture – are formed because historical events provide a common point 
of orientation that can ground individuals in “world of incessant change”. A shared 
experience, defined against the increasingly faster pace of history provides “the most 	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instinctive of ways to transform one’s memory into history”.265 As a result, individuals 
belonging to that generation need to constantly reproduce the memory of the event that 
shaped them, lest it be washed away by the passage of history and new generation-
defining events. By 1978, the ’68 generation was still the dominant voice in French 
society, everyone with a voice in public discourse had lived through the students’ and 
workers’ riots. It makes sense that a decade later, the ’68 generation would need to 
remind the world the significance of their “generation-shaping” event. 
 In the same vein, Michael Seidman argues that May’s impact lay particularly in 
the way it altered personal destinies, rather than social and political practices as a 
whole.266 In the 1978 assessments of May, ‘revolutionary’ was most often used in the 
context of personal ruptures – it provided the opportunity to speak for those who did not 
previously speak, it changed the daily activities of Parisians and it aroused political 
activism in previously apolitical individuals. Conversely, those who saw May as an 
attempt at provoking large-scale political change, usually rejected the term ‘revolution’, 
in favor of ‘illusion’ or ‘utopia’. 
 ‘Generation’ was the defining term of the 1988 commemoration, thanks to the 
mammoth effort of Hérvé Hamon and Patrick Rothman. The duo published a multi-
volume work on the ’68 generation in 1987, followed by a 15-part documentary 
broadcast during the anniversary in 1988. “Generation” followed the life-paths of a 
number of student revolutionaries, from their formative years in Parisian universities 
during the 1960s to their post-68 careers as policymakers, die-hard revolutionaries or 
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converts to the cause of liberal democracy.267 As Kristin Ross perceptively notes, May 
became seen not as a moment of social transformation, or even a permanent individual 
transformation, but rather an “generational process”, a byproduct of maturation, a 
symptom of raging adolescence that the youth of 1968 had outgrown by the time the 
documanteary aired, two decades later.268 The key message of “Generation”, as Hérvé 
Hamon himself noted in a televised interview, was that “revolutions do not change 
society, and the soixante-huitards realized over the course of the 1970s that there are 
other ways of doing that.”269 
 The word ‘revolution’ had acquired a different meaning by the late 1980s. It no 
longer stood for the rupture in French society that May symbolized. Instead, it was most 
often used in conjunction with the adjective “failed”. In an episode of “Generation”, 
symptomatically titled “The Lost Revolution”, Henri Weber explained the failure of 1968 
by the lack of a revolutionary party.270 In the same episode Alain Krivine rejected the 
revolutionary narrative of May, saying that “the communist party does not confound 
revolution with revolt.”271 
Yet since we have explored the political interpretations of May at length earlier in 
this thesis, let us leave aside the two left-wing radicals, and concentrate on the 
interpretations dealing directly with May itself. An editorial in Libération, presented the 
new understanding of May’s revolutionary potential,  a significant shift in representations 	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of May: “the revolutionary symbolics that the [soixante-huitards] grafted onto their 
movement, expressed it badly”.272 In the final episode of “Generation”, a sociology 
student circa 1988 expressed similar views: “’68 had nothing to do with revolutions. It 
was nothing like Che Guevara or Vietnam”.273 These statements echo the pessimist views 
put forth a decade ago in their comparisons of May with other transformative events of 
the 1960s, suggesting that perhaps some of the impact of May had waned. It is perhaps 
not all that surprising that these comments came, on many occasions, from 1988-era 
students, who, even if they were born before ’68, were too young to have intimate 
personal connection with the event.  
Of course, this lack of personal memory could just as easily lead to a valorization 
of May, giving birth to the idea of May-as-utopia. In both the final episodes of 
“Génération” and the two-hour televised “Trial of May”, students often lamented the lack 
of idealism in the present, contrasting it with the lofty “utopian ideals” of 1968.274 “Even 
if the radical ambitions of May did not come to pass, many things did remain and we do 
not notice them well enough”, commented one student.275 “The strikes of ’86 were too 
pragmatist, but then again ’68 was too utopian,” suggested another student.276 Once 
again, the utopian dimension of May was constructed in relation to another milestone 
event, the 1986 university strikes.  
Kristin Ross saw the depolitization of May in the 1980s as a deliberate attempt at 
‘neutering’ the lofty ideals of the soixante-huitards, by reducing it to an “expression of 	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sociohormonal frustration”.277 The tendency towards depolitization was indeed apparent, 
fueled partially by the disillusionment of the revoutionary left (which we discussed in 
Chapter 1), but also a widening generational gap, illustrated vividly by the passing of 
many influential radical public intellectuals: Jean-Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes died 
and Louis Althusser was institutionalized in a psychiatric hospital in 1980, Jacques Lacan 
died in 1981, Michel Foucault passed away in 1984.278 Many of the living soixante-
huitards, exemplified by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, changed their views and denounced May 
themselves. Meanwhile, a increasingly large cohort of French youth was growing up, 
completely untouched by the “revolutionary flower” of May, exposed only to vague 
notions of May as “a liberation of speech and mores”.279 
 Still, one should assume that this view was consensual, or even ubiquitous. 
Images of violence and destruction were still a part of May’s commemorations, footage 
of burnt cars and police violence was broadcast both in news retrospectives as well as 
longer documentaries.280 Several French news programs dedicated reports to the workers’ 
strikes and the Grenelle Accords.281 Finally, just because Cohn-Bendit and other 
prominent revolutionaries rejected the ambitions of the soixante-huitards did not mean 
the everyone else did too. “Remember,” said a 1988 student at Nanterre in a sudden fit of 
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radical idealism, “He’s him, and we’re us.”282  Another Nanterre student noted that the 
aura of ’68 had not yet left the university, even twenty years later: “People do not come 
here for just a diploma, they come for a discussion.”283 Certainly, the social and political 
conditions had changed remarkably in Mitterand-era France, paving the way for a 
“depoliticized” interpretation of May. However, one should not discount the profound 
effects of an emerging generational divide, nor the heterogeneity of possible readings of 
May. 
 The powerful role played by the simple passage of time becomes particularly 
evident in light of the 1998 celebrations of May.  On the one hand there was a larger 
emphasis on ‘pure’, unmediated retrospectives, many newspapers reprinted articles and 
editorials that originally appeared in 1968. Meanwhile, a shift in emphasis occured in the 
selection of commentators: while the previous two anniversaries focused on the soixante-
huitards, left-wing activists and contemporary students, 1998 incorporated more 
historians, sociologists and academics than any previous decennial. Jean-Pierre Rioux 
notes that the decade between 1988 and 1998 saw a resurgence of interest in historical 
and sociological studies of May, as the tensions and conflicts surrounding the 
revolutionary spring became less and less acute. At an anniversary conference in 1998,  
“historiographical concerns were, for the first time, not neglected, the questions of 
archives and oral sources were posed”.284 The publication of Jean-Pierre Le Goff’s major 
historico-sociological study, “Mai 68 – The Impossible Heritage” turned the unassuming 
bald sociologist into a media star, who appeared in prime-time television debates and 	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interviews in major French daily newspapers.285 Finally, several broadcasts focused on 
the present-day lives of the remaining soixante-huitards, most of whom had stayed 
involved in counter-cultural affairs, injecting a sense of scepticism towards the 1998 
status quo into the debate. 
 This slightly schizophrenic mixture of approaches created a picture of May that 
retained the utopian flavor of 1968 that had dominated the second decennial, but allowed 
for a more nuanced and more critical perspective to shine through in the form of 
scholarly commentaries. More often than ever before, the utopian idealism of May 
underscored the failings of the French social and political system. L’Humanité ran an 
extended special on the heritage of May, where it asked prominent scholars and soixante-
huitards from around the world “What essential truth did May 68 bring to light that our 
society is most lacking now?” Often the answer referred to the idealism of May, the 
unseizable “spirit of May” that had for a month engulfed the country and was never heard 
from again. “Dialogue of a critical spirit”, “The desire for liberty”, “imagining the 
unimaginable”, “Hope for a ‘Big One’”, “the power to say: No”.286 A documentary film 
about the contemporary activities of former soixante-huitards was equally critical of the 
1998 establishment. The university system was worse than before, the working class was 
being replaced by robots – former revolutionaries saw little to praise about 1998, noting 
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time and again how the idealism of 1968 was the one thing sorely needed in 
contemporary France.287  
 The 1998 commemorations of May are harder to boil down to a single theme than 
those of 1988 or 1978, but perhaps this lack of unity is itself a sign of a historical 
development. When 1978 concentrated around reliving the rupture of 1968, emphasizing 
its break with reality, the radical shock it produced in the French social fabric; and 1988 
was a period of depolitization and disillusionment, a distancing from May, then 1998 
seems like a series of attempts to make May relevant again. More than ever, the third ten-
year anniversary of May was concerned with the present, not with the past, in fact 1968 
was an event that had to recalled, before it could be remembered – hence the 
extraordinary efforts in Le Monde and Libération to simply recount the events of May, 
without commentary, without judgement, simply through reproducing articles originally 
written three decades ago. Commentators on the other hand, were more concerned with 
relating the ideals of May to current affairs, than assessing or evaluating the chronology 
of May itself. Ironically, the ‘idealism’ of May was as vaguely defined as it had been for 
decades, rather than meaning a revolution in the traditional, Marxist sense, it meant 
anything from a “critical dialogue” to a “desire for liberty”. In this mix of interpretations, 
the spirit of May had indeed become incomprehensible, as many commentators had 
predicted. 
 The diffuse spirit of May had become even more diffuse by the fortieth 
anniversary of 1968. Often the clearest answer one could give to the question ‘What was 
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May 1968 about?’ was “It’s vague, but it’s good”.288 The increasing historication of May 
had opened the door for revisions and reevaluations that had previously avoided the front 
pages of French dailies and prime-time slots of network television. The words 
‘revolution’ and ‘rupture’ re-entered the vocabulary of newspaper headlines, appearing 
next to articles celebrating the ‘social utopia’ of 1968 . “The explosion of May ’68 – A 
revolution without a tomorrow” one day, “The perverse effects of May’s joyous utopia” 
the other.289 Sociologists and historians, who now dominated the commemorative 
discourse, emphasized the “forgotten” aspects of May – the workers strikes,290 the 
revolutionary aspirations of gauchiste cliques,291 and the chauvinism of May’s leaders.292 
Next to the critical reappraisals, the old tropes of a utopian, idealist May survived equally 
well – From depoliticized utopian representations to feminist interpretations, the 
“imaginary May” lived on.293 Finally, president Sarkozy’s promise to “liquidate the 
heritage of 1968” had added a new layer of ideology to the commemorations, an aspect 
that colored almost every longer discussion of May at some point.  
 If the voices of soixante-huitards dominated the discussion of 1968 ten years after 
the revolts, forty years later those voices had almost died out, literally. Most student 
activists of ’68 were now in their sixties and most governmental officials and union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Deshabillons-lez: Mai 68, quarante ans des souvenirs, on TF1, March 28, 2008, INA 
289 “L’explosion de May 68, une revolution sans lendemain” in Le Monde, May 11, 2008 
and “Les effets pervers de la joyeuse utopie de 68” in L’Echo, May 27, 2008 
290 For instance in “Les effets pervers de la joyeuse utopie de 68”; “Deshabillons-les”; 
and “Droit d’inventaire” on France 3,  January 3, 2008, INA 
291 Examples are, among others, “Droit d’inventaire”; “Actualités a 1920 heures” on 
France 3, April 30, 2008, INA;  and “L’Héritage insaissable de Mai 68” in Le Figaro, 
May 17, 2008 
292 “Droit d’inventaire”; “Actualités a 12 heures” on France 3, May 2, 2008, INA 
293 “Actualités a 12 heures” on France 3, May 2, 2008, INA; and “C’est au programme” 
on France 2, May 19, 2008, INA 
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leaders had passed away, or were too old to perform an active and visible role in society. 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit was a notable exception, yet even he had to face the fading legacy of 
May in a France 3 special report which paired him up with Maurice Grimaud, the prefect 
of Paris in 1968, the institutional symbol of the CRS, the symbolic arch-enemy of the 
‘German Jew’. The meeting was ripe with nostalgia, as the two former adversaries 
(Grimaud was then over 90 years old) shared their memories of ’68 and agreed with 
each-other more often than not. “Maurice Grimaud and the prefect of Paris are not the 
same thing,” Cohn-Bendit noted, in response to Grimaud’s explanation for the use of 
violence in containing the student riots. “There is a heritage to May 1968,” the special 
report concluded, but one is tempted to add that a heritage which can join the two biggest 
adversaries of the Parisian revolts in a nostalgic, friendly recollection of the past, has to 
be one that is in well on its way from being memory to becoming history.  
 A 2008 poll showed that a majority of French youth believed May 1968 to have 
been a “generally positive” “students’ revolt and workers’ strike” for the cause of “social 
progress” and advancement for “gender equality”, “social protection” and “union 
rights”.294 By contrast, class struggle and workers’ rights were mentioned by a minority 
of French youth when a similar poll was conducted in 2001.295 The slow, yet persistent 
historization of May allowed counter-narratives of May to emerge in the popular media 
and an increasingly dispassionate relationship with May made it easier for those 
narratives to take hold. The narratives of May in 2008 were no longer written by Henri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 “Sondage: Les francais plebiscitent Mai 68 comme ‘un période de progres social’” in 
Le Monde, May 14, 2008 
295 L’Express, April 16, 2001 
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Weber, Alain Krivine or Jacques Chirac, they were written by sociologists like Jacques 
Le Goff, or historians like Max Gallo.296 
 Four decades of May commemorations have shown the passage of a mythical 
event from memory to history. To an extent, this process has coincided with the passage 
of the ’68 generation, from actuality to history. By the first decennial of 1968, the French 
public had not yet recovered from the shellshock of a massive social rupture, inciting 
discussions about the “revolutionary”, “unforgettable” nature of May. Yet May turned 
out to be more forgettable than its participants believed – by 1988, the revolutionary 
narrative of May had been replaced by a plurality of interpretations, most involving a 
shift away from the political and into the realm of the social. The following two decades 
saw the responsibility of commemoration shift from the shoulders of the soixante-
huitards to sociologists, and then finally to the historians. Michelle Zancarini-Fournel 
notes that the first major historical works about 1968 started appearing in the early 1990s 
and proliferated in the early 2000s.297 It is no coincidence that the number of historical 
treatments of 1968 increased during the same period when the role of soixante-huitards 
in commemorating May decreased – the emergence of new social concerns and the aging 
of the 1968 generation relieved May of passion and created the opening that revisionist 
accounts of May could fill. 
 Yet we should not assume that forty years has been enough, that the ’68 seen from 
2008 was a completely historical May. The explosion of publications, broadcasts and 
scholarly literature, the re-ideologization of May by Nicolas Sarkozy and the fact that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Most notably, the only soixante-huitard in the two-hour analysis of May’s legacy, 
“Droit d’inventaire” was Daniel Cohn-Bendit, all other analysts were scholars.  
297 For a longer discussion of French historiography of 1968, see Michelle Zancarini-
Fournel, Le Moment 68: Une histoire contestée, Paris: Seuil, 2008 
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French public still considers May to be the single most important event of the 20th 
century after World War II shows that May 1968 is still in the realm of memory, though 
openings for historical inquiry have emerged. Jean-Pierre Leroux calls May “a history 
still in shadow, a memory that has lost its shine”298, but perhaps a more appropriate, and 
indeed, more optimistic definition comes from Pierre Nora’s concept of a lieux de 
mémoire: “moments of history, torn away from history, then returned; no longer quite 
life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded”.299 
Though this was not the case in 1984, when Nora started his landmark work in historical 
memory, May 1968 by 2008 had become a lieux de mémoire par excellence, a historical 
event forced into collective memory by commemorations, retrospectives and re-
evaluations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Jean-Pierre Leroux, “L’événement-mémoire”, 14 
299 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” in 
Representations, 26 (1989), 12 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
 Commemorations of May 1968 did not produce a cohesive, unified narrative of 
the students’ and workers’ revolts, nor were they constant, discreetly delineable exercises 
in memorialization, appropriation or subversion. This is perhaps the greatest problem 
with descriptions of collective memory: the term itself suggests the sort of unity and 
structure that reality can never provide. Anniversaries of May 1968 produced a number of 
persuasive, often contradictory narratives that evolved and changed over time, in 
response to the evolving structures of public discourse, changing social and political 
interests and various personal concerns of individuals with enough cultural capital to 
shape the course of May’s commemorations. In addition to the macrocosm of social 
structures, the microcosm of memory structures also influenced May’s mythology. 
Stories of concentrated individual heroism triumphed over narratives of diffuse social 
upheaval, later attempts at affecting social change got incorporated into the May 
mythology and May itself became a metaphor for a variety of social, political and cultural 
trends, from narratives of increasing moral relativism to deep feelings of progressive 
disillusionment. Sometimes narratives of ’68 stood and fell by their capacity to tap into 
national archetypes, as evidenced by the success of Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s career as an 
unpredictable trickster facing an opposition of institutionalized anti-semitism.  Though 
broad frameworks of consensus and disagreement can be identified in some aspects of 
commemoration, it is through focusing on the evolution of specific narratives that we can 
better gauge the immense interpretive potential of the May revolts. The Political May, 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s May, the Feminist May and the Revolutionary-Utopian May are 
just a few examples of the plurality of narratives that have defined the mythology of ’68.  
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 40 years after the revolutionary spring, debates have become less passionate and 
more scholarly, and the mythology of May has become more varied and more egalitarian. 
A new generation has emerged who know May only through its commemorations, not 
through the event itself. In some ways, May 1968 has become history. Yet much of the 
mythology still persists, and new narratives are still being created. 2008 was by far the 
most prolific anniversary of May, and the ‘most important event of the 20th century after 
World War II’ is still far from being relegated solely to the domain of historians. Quite 
the contrary, if May 1968 has become a lieux de mémoire, if it has become an 
“exclusively self-referential sign”, a myth so laden with different meanings and 
interpretations that it is as grounded in its commemorations as it is in the historical reality 
of 1968, then it may, in fact, survive many more decennials before finally becoming 
history.  
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APPENDIX: 
MAY ’68 ON FRENCH TELEVISION 
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